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The current study consisted of a pilot and two experiments that explored the effects 
of “shared reality”—experiencing commonality with others’ inner states about some 
aspect of the world—on clinically relevant emotional processes, such as emotional 
regulation, attachment, well-being, and positive and negative affects. The primary 
aim was to contribute to our understanding of the implications of social sharing on 
emotional experience and regulation, using the well-established paradigm of shared 
reality. Shared reality has been studied thus far in connection to social-cognitive 
processes such as memory and attribution. The current study is the first application 
of this paradigm to emotional research.  
The study showed that shared reality intensifies negative emotional 
reactions, but not ambiguous ones. In addition, the study showed that shared reality 
makes people feel less guilty and fearful, but failed to show that it increases secure 
attachment to others. The study suggests that shared reality operates by making 
aspects of perceived reality seem more relevant and thus, it is argued, more 
accesible. Implications of the findings to emotional research and clinical practice, as 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
“The awful thing is that beauty is mysterious as well as terrible. God and the devil are 
fighting there and the battlefield is the heart of man.”  
 
Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Brothers Karamazov  
 
Aim of the Study 
The primary aim of the current research is to investigate further the 
relational and interpersonal aspects of social sharing. More specifically, the studies 
that are part of this research investigate a particular experimental situation deemed 
“shared reality”—experiencing commonality with others’ inner states about some 
aspect of the world (Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Higgins, 1992). This research (two 
studies and a pilot) examines the effects of shared reality on several aspects of 
emotional experience and regulation, including intensity of feeling, attachment, and 
experienced positive and negative affects.  
Theoretical, Research Background and Rationale of Study 
One of the main questions concerning human motivation has been whether 
humankind is innately good or innately bad—in other words, prone to love or 
aggression, or God-like or devil-like. Since Freud, however, many psychologists have 
reformulated this question by postulating that the battle is not between good and 
bad, but between animal-like seeking of pleasure and rational renunciation of it 
(Higgins & Pittman, 2008). To Freud and like-minded others, the (partial) resolution 
of this conflict is the basis of modern civilization and the human ability to live 
together as a group (Freud, 1930).  
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The animal-like view of human motivation dominated psychoanalytic 
literature (Mitchell, 1993; Mitchell & Black, 1996) and experimental psychology 
(Higgins, 2012; Higgins & Pittman, 2008) throughout much of the early 20th century, 
leading Higgins and Pittman (2008) to assert that psychologists historically viewed 
“humans as having the mind of a God and the motives of a brute” (p. 363). In 
psychoanalysis this perception of human motivation began to shift in the 1940’s 
with the advent of what has been called object-relations theory. This model 
emphasizes the need to connect to others, with most theorists of this tradition 
replacing the animal-like aggressive and sexual drives with the drive to connect 
with others as the central human motivation (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983; 
Kernberg, 2004), and more recently a drive to create meaning in life through 
interactions with others (Mitchell, 1993; Mitchell & Aron, 1999).  
In experimental psychology, recent decades have seen a somewhat similar 
shift to psychoanalysis with theorists and researchers in this field emphasizing the 
human need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), understand oneself and others 
(Lieberman, 2007), and comprehend, manage, and share inner states (Higgins & 
Pittman, 2008). From this perspective, sharing inner states—beliefs, goals, thoughts, 
and feelings—with others is a powerful human need that is present from childhood 
and in the absence of which humans experience significant psychological and at 
times even physical discomfort and distress (Fonagy & Target, 1997; Higgins & 
Pittman, 2008; Linehan, 1993; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2010).  
The contemporary emphasis on relational and interpersonal aspects of 
human motivation and psychological development has affected clinical theory and 
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research as well. Concepts such as attachment (e.g., Bowlby, 1969; Mikulincer & 
Shaver, 2010), validation of internal emotional experience (e.g., Linehan, 1993), and 
attunement to emotional experience (e.g., Schore, 2009; Stern, Hofer, Haft, & Dore, 
1985) have been proposed to be essential to healthy human development and have 
been central to modern conceptualization of psychotherapy process and change. In 
addition, psychotherapy research has been emphasizing the therapeutic alliance and 
the relationship between the therapist and patient (e.g., Horvath, 2000, Horvath & 
Bedi, 2002) as essential mechanisms of change.  
Despite this emphasis, many facets of emotional experience and regulation 
that are interpersonal in nature (for example, the effect of sharing one’s emotions on 
one’s stress and arousal; Rime, 2009) remain obscure. Moreover, the experimental 
exploration of the relational and interpersonal aspects of emotional experience and 
regulation seems to be the realm of social rather than clinical psychology (Fischer, 
Manstead, & Zaalberg, 2003; Rime, 2009). The aim of the current research, 
therefore, is to expand our understanding of relational aspects of emotional 
experience and regulation by focusing on one relevant and well-studied concept 
from the social psychology paradigm, that of “shared reality” (Hardin & Higgins, 
1996; Higgins, 1992), and applying it to the study of clinical themes that are relevant 
to emotional experience and regulation, such as intensity of feeling and well-being. 
 Two experiments and a pilot were designed for the purposes of the current 
research. Both experiments introduced a novel experimental design where 
participants shared their perceptions of emotional stimuli, shared reality was 
manipulated, and its effects on multiple emotional processes was empirically 
4 
 
examined.  An additional and broader aspiration of this research was to combine 
two fields that usually exist in separation: social and clinical psychology. The pilot 
and the first study were more exploratory in nature. They did not follow specific 
hypotheses and examined, together, a basic effect of shared reality on perceived 
intensity of emotions. Study 2 built upon the experimental paradigm of the pilot and 
study 1, was more comprehensive, and examined several hypotheses regarding the 
effects of shared reality on multiple emotional variables. 
The idea that sharing one’s distress with another alleviates distress seems to 
be one of the cornerstones of psychotherapy. Frequently, psychotherapists 
encourage their patients to share their emotions, presuming that it will reduce their 
suffering. But what exactly does the act of sharing achieve? And how does it 
operate? Perhaps surprisingly, the experimental evidence for the usefulness of 
sharing is rather mixed (Rime, 2009). For example, although it has been shown that 
disclosing and sharing emotions has positive psychological, social, and health 
consequences (Pennebaker & Seagal, 1999; Pennebaker, Zech, & Rime, 2001), some 
authors suggested that there is no consistent empirical support for the notion that 
putting an emotional experience into words can alleviate the distress or change the 
memory associated to it (Rime, 2009), that self-disclosure of patients in 
psychotherapy has necessarily positive outcomes (Farber, 2006), or that 
“venting“—expressing negative emotions such as anger or sadness to others—leads 
to relief (Kennedy-Moore & Watson, 1999). Thus, further empirical study of the 
effects of social sharing on emotional experience and regulation seems necessary.  
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Despite the lack of consensus in the literature regarding the specific effects of 
social sharing on immediate emotional experience (Rime, 2009), research in social 
psychology has begun to identify the motives for sharing. The need to share is 
hypothesized to stem from two main motives: epistemic and relational (Echterhoff, 
Higgins, & Levine, 2009). The Epistemic Motive refers to the need to achieve a valid 
and reliable understanding of the world, particularly the social world (Hardin & 
Higgins, 1996) and establish what is real (Higgins, 1992; Higgins, 2012). The 
Relational Motive refers to the need to feel connected to others (Baumeister & Leary, 
1995; Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Pinel, Long, Landau, Alexander, & Pyszczynski, 2006). 
Thus, social sharing allows humans to both experience a more valid and reliable 
view of the world and to feel more connected to others.  
The current research is the first empirical exploration of the effects of shared 
reality on different aspects of emotional regulation and experience and it proposes 
an initial conception of the effects of shared reality on these aspects. In addition, and 
taking into account the findings regarding the motives for sharing, the study also 
proposes a possible mechanism of operation of shared reality that is derived from 
the empirical findings that will be described.  
While social sharing is a fundamental and ubiquitous human activity, a 
particular paradigm of sharing was proposed by Higgins and colleagues and has 
been termed shared reality—experiencing commonality with others’ inner states 
about some aspect of the world. An example of shared reality is the experience that 
one’s feelings about a third person converge with the feelings of one or more others 
regarding that person (Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Higgins, 1992; for a recent review of 
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the concept see Echterhoff et al., 2009). Shared reality has been studied thus far 
predominantly in what has been known as the “communication game:” (Higgins, 
1992) in which sharing reality with others affects the way people communicate to 
others (tuning their messages to audience’s perceived attitudes) and the way they 
remember their communication, leading to the “saying-is-believing effect” (people 
remember what they communicated, not what they initially learned; Higgins & 
Rholes, 1978). Despite the apparent emotional implications of the concept and 
despite similarities to clinical and psychoanalytical study of the phenomenon of 
sharing, shared reality has not been studied yet in relation to emotional experience. 
The current study attempts to fill this gap and seeks to understand the psychological 















CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Sharing and relational aspects of emotional experience and regulation 
The second half of the 20th century has brought a gradual shift in the 
understanding of human motivation and etiology of psychological disorders in 
clinical literature. In psychoanalysis, the field has been slowly moving away from 
the Freudian animalistic, destructive view of human motivation to views that 
emphasize the need for attachment to others (Bowlby, 1969) and relationships to 
significant others that, through internalization from childhood, provide the basis for 
psychological health (moving from a conflict model of pathology to a deficit model of 
pathology; for a review of this shift see Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983; Mitchell & 
Black, 1996). The debate whether the Freudian animalistic, unconscious “drives” or 
the need for connection to and internalization of others is the primary source of 
human motivation and the central cause of pathology (because of conflict in Freud; 
or deficit in later approaches) is still ongoing in the psychoanalytic literature 
(Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983; Kernberg, 2004; Levenson, 2010). However, 
contemporary clinical theory and research, both inside and outside of the 
psychoanalytic tradition, has been shifting towards the latter view that promotes 
connection and attachment (Mitchell & Black, 1996; Porges, 2011; Schore, 2009).  
Several lines of research and theory have contributed to this shift. I will first 
mention them briefly here and will then discuss some of them in more detail. First, 
ever since Bowlby’s (1969) introduction of the concept of attachment, empirical 
research of infants, especially in a dyadic context of infant-parent, has provided 
support for the importance of healthy attachments and parental validation of the 
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infant’s inner experience for the child’s ability to regulate emotions, understand the 
world, and be psychologically healthy (Beebe, Knoblauch, Rustin, & Sorter, 2005; 
Fonagy, 2001, 2003; Main, Hesse, & Kaplan, 2005; Stern, 2000).  
Second, neuropsychological research in recent decades, through 
identification of specific regions and mechanisms in the brain, has emphasized the 
primacy of the interpersonal and social life to the development of the human ability 
to understand the world and function in it. Mechanisms that promote social 
engagement (e.g., Porges, 2011), mutual affect regulation (e.g., Schore, 2009), 
imitation, association of emotion with imitation in children, and development of 
empathy (e.g., “mirror neurons” research, see Gallese, 2003, 2005; Rizzolati & Arbib, 
1998), children’s play and its effect on the cortex, programming it to become “fully 
social” (e.g., Panksepp, 2009), chronic emotional invalidation and its effect on the 
brain, causing psychopathology and trauma (e.g., Bromberg, 1998; Herman, 1992; 
van der Kolk 2004), have all recently been introduced and described. In general, 
neuroscientific research has generated a body of research that expanded our 
understanding of the primacy of social engagement, social sharing, and the seeking 
of emotional validation and empathy as motivators of human behavior and 
prerequisites for psychological health.  
Third, the etiology of many psychological disorders is now understood in the 
interpersonal context, rather than in the intrapsychic context (as it was in the 
Freudian tradition or more recently in the cognitive tradition; see Beck, 1972). 
Borderline personality disorder (e.g., Linehan, 1993; Linehan & Dexter-Mazza, 
2008), depression (e.g., Bleiberg & Markowitz, 2008; Panksepp, 2009; Weissman, 
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Markowitz, & Klerman, 2000), and some forms of psychological trauma (e.g., 
Bromberg, 1998; Herman, 1992; Schore, 2001), are among the disorders that are 
now understood by many researchers as consequences of severe social deprivation 
and invalidation.  
Fourth, psychotherapy research has shifted the focus of change in 
therapeutic work from insight and cognitive change to relational aspects, such as the 
alliance between the patient and therapist (e.g., Horvath & Bedi, 2002; Wampold, 
2001), mutual affect regulation between therapist and patient (e.g., Schore 2009), 
alliance rupture and repair (Safran & Muran, 2003), dyadic co-creation of meaning 
and expansion of consciousness (Mitchell, 1993; Tronick, 2009), and attunement 
and validation of inner states (Stern, 2000, 2004).     
Contemporary developmental, clinical, and neuroscientific research and 
theory emphasize attachment and secure connection to significant others from early 
age as the central requisite for psychological health and functioning, rich emotional 
experience, and the ability to regulate one’s emotions. The connection to others is 
established through many social mechanisms, among them social sharing. A child 
that is not able to share his experience with his caregivers, his emotional reaction to 
the world is invalidated, and does not feel understood by his caregivers, is in risk for 
developing various forms of psychopathology, may be lacking the ability to reflect 
on the world and himself, and lacking the ability to regulate his emotional states 
(Fonagy & Target, 1997; Fonagy et al., 2003, Linehan, 1993; Stern, 2000, 2004).  
Increasingly, the origin of the human mind has been seen as dyadic and 
dialogic (see Beebe et al., 2005). From the preverbal correspondences, imitations, 
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and matching of the newborn and caregiver, to explicit verbal sharing of his 
experience, representation of others’ behaviors, and others’ reflections on his own 
behaviors and inner states, the child is developing what some researchers call a 
“shared mind,” a mind that cannot be separated from the intersubjective context in 
which it develops (Beebe et al., 2005; also see Stern, 2000). One of the central 
concepts in this line of research has been “affective attunement” (Stern et al., 1985; 
Stern, 2000), which emphasizes the importance of the caregiver’s ability for cross-
modal attunement, i.e., the caregiver’s ability to infer and match an inner state of the 
child (not only his overt behavior), thus making the inner state the referent of the 
attunement, rather than the overt behavior. For example, the mother’s ability to 
infer that the child is sad, despite him not crying, and her ability to affectively match 
the sadness, by facial expressions (and at a later stage, verbalize it as an act of 
regulation). In Stern’s view, affective attunement provides the bridge between the 
presymbolic mind and the symbolic mind. Experiences that are attuned to become 
the experiences that the child shares and that are validated; those that do not, 
become, potentially, experiences of “not-me” and are not integrated to the self (see 
Beebe et al., 2005, p. 67). Chronic failure in affect attunement by the caregiver 
creates psychological pain for the child, deficiency in the sense of self, and inability 
to self-regulate and self-reflect (Stern et al., 1985; Stern, 2000).  
Developmental research in psychology influenced contemporary therapeutic 
approaches that have gradually begun emphasizing the mutuality in the creation of 
meaning between therapist and patient, and in the process of regulating the 
patient’s emotions. In therapy, as in development, the goal for many theorists and 
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researchers became the facilitation of mutual “meaning making”—that is, 
understanding the world and oneself in a deeper, richer way as a result of the 
therapist’s (or the mother’s) provision of an environment in which the patient can 
easily share his inner states and they can be validated (Fonagy, 2001; Fonagy & 
Target, 1997; Linehan, 1993). Tronick (2009, p. 88) writes:  
Successful meaning making carries with it a sense of expansion and 
positive affects; these feelings…(are) perhaps leading to a feeling of 
exuberance and aliveness, or an oceanic feeling of wellness. When 
successful meaning is made with another person, a feeling of connection 
and synchrony emerges, a mutual sense of being together in a special 
state. Failure to evoke meaning generates negative affects, fearfulness, 
anxiety, and a constriction and shrinking.   
Linehan (1993; Linehan & Dexter-Mazza, 2008) in her study of borderline 
personality disorder, has emphasized the importance of “invalidating 
environments“ to the development of the disorder. In her theory, the invalidating 
environment is defined by “its tendency to negate, punish, and/or respond 
erratically and inappropriately to private experiences, independent of the validity of 
the actual behavior“ (Linehan & Dexter-Mazza, 2008, p. 373). In such environments 
communication and sharing of private experiences and self-generated behaviors are 
indiscriminately rejected and emotional displays sometimes punished. An individual 
growing up in such an environment may never learn how to label and regulate 
emotions, may not develop a coherent sense of self and stable identity, and may 
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mistrust internal states and be dependent on others to understand how to act, think, 
and feel.  
The idea that there are pathological consequences of environments that do 
not enable the child to securely share his or her inner experiences with a caregiver 
is echoed by many developmental and clinical researchers, (for a review see Beebe, 
et al., 2005). Fonagy (Fonagy, 2001; Fonagy & Target, 1997) stresses the importance 
of secure attachment for the infant’s ability to develop theory of mind and reflective 
function (which he terms mentalization). In his definition, the reflective function is 
the ability to represent behavior in terms of mental states and is a key determinant 
of self-organization, which is acquired in early social relationships (recall Higgins & 
Pittman’s, 2008 description of the human motivation to comprehend, manage, and 
share inner states). The reflective function allows children to react not only to 
others’ behaviors, but also to their beliefs, plans, and hopes, and enables them to 
“read“ others’ minds. By doing so, others’ and one’s own behaviors become 
meaningful and predictable, as opposed to erratic and uncomprehandable (Fonagy 
& Target, 1997).  In the absence of a caregiver that facilitates self-reflection by 
labeling the child’s emotions, communicating an understanding of his or her inner 
states, and allowing him or her to express and share inner states, the reflective 
function will not develop fully, which might lead to a deficient sense of self, inability 
to form social relations, and chronic inability to regulate one’s emotions.  
The research reviewed in this section represents a reaction in the clinical 
field to the historic dominance of either the Freudian tradition or the cognitive 
tradition (see Ryan, 2007 for a discussion of the “paradigm shift“ in psychology from 
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cognitive dominance to emphasis on motivation and emotion in psychology). As 
mentioned, in part, this shift has consisted of focusing on interpersonal aspects of 
human development and motivation, but another significant part has been the focus, 
noted earlier, on emotional experience. Some clinical researchers have gone as far 
as suggesting that therapy is not the “talking cure“ but the “affect regulation cure“ 
(Schore, 2009). The current clinical emphasis is on the relational aspects of 
development and pathology, such as the effects of attachment and validation on 
psychological development, but also, and increasingly, on the emotional experience 
itself. According to some theorists and researchers  for an enduring change as a 
result of psychotherapy to occur  it is not sufficient to alter problematic cognitions 
of patients or provide insight, but also to focus on (at times, preverbal) emotional 
contents and their mutual regulation in the context of a safe, validating therapeutic 
environment in which the patient is attuned to and is able to share inner 
experiences (Fonagy & Target, 1997; Linehan & Dexter-Mazza, 2008; Ryan, 2007; 
Schore, 2009).     
Despite the consensus on the long-term benefits of safe, validated sharing on 
all aspects of psychological health, the immediate effects of sharing on emotional 
experience and regulation are not clear (Kennedy-Moore & Watson, 1999; Rime, 
2009). For example, Farber (2006) concludes that the literature on the outcomes of 
patients’ self-disclosure in psychotherapy is inconsistent and argues that it can 
cause either distress or relief, with the different outcome contingent upon multiple 
variables, such as patients’ characteristic manner of coping with stress (e.g., 
sensitizing vs. repressing personal information). This gap and inconsistency in the 
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literature prompted the current research in an attempt to investigate the effects of 
social sharing on clinically relevant aspects of emotional experience and regulation. 
One experimental paradigm, shared reality (Higgins, 1992), was chosen as it can 
provide a rigorous empirical test of the effects of social sharing on emotional 
processes.  
The following part reviews the concept of shared reality and the literature 
associated with it. As mentioned, shared reality has not been studied yet in 
connection to emotional processes; hence, the literature review will focus on what 
we know about this concept in general and will describe the experimental 
components of the concept that were considered when designing the current 
experiments.  
Shared Reality 
The concept of shared reality was introduced by Higgins (1992) as an 
explanation and expansion of the previously established “saying-is-believing” effect 
(Higgins & Rholes, 1978). In the initial saying-is-believing study participants read a 
short essay about a target person and then communicated about him (without using 
his name) to an audience. The essay included evaluatively ambiguous behavioral 
descriptions of the target that were characterized by both positive and negative 
traits. For example, one of the ambiguous descriptions was “independent/aloof.” In 
this description, the target was presented as having limited contact with others, 
which could be interpreted as either a sign of being independent and self-reliant or 
as a sign of being aloof and a “loner.” The participants were told that the audience’s 
task was to identify the target based on their message description of him.  
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Before communicating the message, the participants were informed by the 
research confederate (off-handedly and presumably with no relation to the task) 
that the audience either liked or disliked the target. This information led to message 
tuning: the participants produced a more positive message if they believed that the 
audience liked the target and a more negative one if they believed that they did not 
like him. Perhaps even more strikingly, the participants also “tuned” their 
memories: when they were asked to recall the information about the target (even 
weeks later) their recall was evaluatively biased in the direction of their message 
and they remembered what they communicated (more positive or more negative 
message) and not what they learned (an ambiguous message). Several studies 
replicated this effect on communication and memory (Higgins & McCann, 1984; 
Higgins, McCann, & Fondacaro, 1982; Sedikides, 1990; Todorov, 2002; for a review 
see Echterhoff, Higgins, & Groll, 2005). The basic paradigm of the saying-is-believing 
study—a communicator that produces a message to an audience about a target after 
learning about their attitude towards the target—has remained the central 
experimental paradigm in studying shared reality effects and has been modified 
over the years to distinguish the effect from similar effects and to understand the 
conditions under which it succeeds or fails. These conditions will be discussed later 
in this review. 
Focusing on the interpersonal dimensions in the construction of reality in the 
saying-is-believing effect, Higgins (1992) proposed that the effect involved in the 
creation of a shared reality between the communicator and the audience is an 
experience of commonality between the inner attitude of the communicator and the 
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audience about the target person. Producing and sharing a message that was 
congruent with the inner attitude of the audience about the target created new 
knowledge for the communicator (i.e., the target person has positive/negative 
traits), which was remembered by the communicator and experienced as a reliable 
and valid account of the target. An implicit goal of the communicator (i.e., a goal he 
or she is not aware of) in the communication was to create shared reality with the 
audience, an action that influenced and created meaning.  
Later studies showed that a failure in the creation of shared reality 
eliminates the saying-is-believing effect. For example, Echerhoff et al. (2005) 
showed that participants did not exhibit biased memories after producing a biased 
message to the audience, if the audience failed to recognize the target and thus 
failed in creation of shared reality with the communicator. Higgins (1992) argued 
that the creation of shared reality in the saying-is-believing effect represents a basic 
human objective in social interaction of creating a common ‘social reality,’ a reality 
that is constructed through interpersonal interactions (Asch, 1952; Festinger, 1950; 
Sherif, 1936). Social reality shapes human beliefs and opinions about the world, 
since humans tend to construct them based on the beliefs and opinions of others 
and not on physical reality or hard facts (Festinger, 1950). In the saying-is-believing 
paradigm the evaluatively ambiguous nature of the target is especially conducive to 
the creation of social reality in which the opinion about the target is shaped by the 
presumed opinion of the audience. Thus, the shared reality becomes the reality:  
…when communicators achieve ‘shared reality’ with their audience about 
a target person, this ‘shared reality’ is likely to be treated as reality 
17 
 
especially when the representation of the stimulus input, i.e., the physical 
reality, has decayed or become inaccessible. (Higgins, 1992, p. 119).  
Participants in shared reality studies have not yet formed an evaluative 
attitude towards the ambiguous target when learning about their audience’s 
attitude (Echterhoff et al., 2005, 2009). Thus, the process of creating a shared reality 
in the saying-is-believing paradigm is a process in which the communicators 
construct a view of the target using interpersonal information and the reality they 
construct is a social reality. In addition, Hardin and Higgins (1996) hypothesized 
that shared reality fostered interpersonal trust and reliance on others, since it 
involved trusting another’s views of the world, thus promoting the relational 
dimension of social sharing (Echterhoff et al., 2005, 2009).   
In a recent review Echterhoff et al. (2009) identified four necessary 
conditions for the creation of shared reality and reviewed the theoretical and 
empirical evidence for these conditions. Failure to achieve any of these four 
conditions leads to failure in achieving shared reality, making the situation a 
different type of social interaction and sharing, not shared reality.  
The first condition is the commonality of inner states. Echterhoff et al. (2009) 
argue that in order for a social situation to be a shared reality the participants need 
to experience commonality of their inner states (beliefs, judgments, feelings) and 
not just their observable, overt behaviors. They need to believe that the other 
person perceives some aspect of the world (an individual, political party, painting) 
similarly to them. In the saying-is-believing paradigm that would usually entail 
perceiving commonality regarding liking or disliking a target person. Similarity in 
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overt behaviors (such as mimicking) can suggest very different inner states; it is 
suggested that inner states can mediate overt behavior, and human recognition of 
these mediations is a powerful motive (Higgins & Pittman, 2008) and a prerequisite 
to the creation of shared reality. Several studies showed that even if communicators 
tune their messages to the audience (i.e., exhibit a common overt perception of the 
target) the saying-is-believing effect disappears if they do not experience 
commonality between their and their audience’s inner state. For example, 
Echterhoff, Higgins, Kopietz, & Groll (2008) showed that when communicators were 
blatantly instructed to take their audience’s attitudes towards the target person into 
account (as opposed to the usual off-handed mentioning of the attitude) the saying-
is-believing effect was also eliminated.  
Second, the authors argue that shared reality is about something, which 
implies a target referent, an aspect of the world. As mentioned, in the saying-is-
believing paradigm it is usually a target person. However, and based on this theory, 
it can be any aspect of the world that individuals can experience in a converging 
manner. The objects of reality that are shared can be in the present (popular actor) 
past (legendary football game) or future (a couple imagining how much both of 
them will enjoy their mutual child; Higgins & Pittman, 2008). This condition has not 
been studied as extensively and was not manipulated directly so far, but rather 
inferred theoretically (see Higgins, 1992; Hardin & Higgins, 1996). However, it 
received empirical support in at least one study. Echterhoff et al. (2008) showed 
that when communicators were instructed to tune their messages in an exaggerated 
manner for the sake of their audience entertainment, the communicators did not 
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perceive their messages as a valid representation of the target and the saying-is-
believing effect disappeared. Thus, the “aboutness” condition was eliminated by 
purposeful exaggeration of the target.   
Third, the motivation for the creation of shared reality is as important as the 
end-goal of establishing shared reality itself. Echterhoff et al. (2009) identify two 
main motives for the creation of shared reality: an epistemic motive (establishing a 
valid and reliable representation of the world) and a relational motive (connecting 
to others; for a review of these motives see Bar-Tal, 2000 and Hardin & Higgins, 
1996). If an individual adopts another person’s inner state about an object in the 
world, but this process is driven by “external,” instrumental motives (such as being 
liked by someone or taking another’s perspective for the sake of argument), the 
ensuing social sharing and interaction is not shared reality. Several studies 
confirmed and clarified this condition. For example, Kopietz et al. (2010; experiment 
1) showed that when communicators simply followed a blatant demand in tuning 
their messages (thus, making the motivation explicit) the saying-is-believing effect 
disappeared. It was also shown that communicators did not exhibit the saying-is-
believing effect when communicating to a person they were not motivated to share 
their inner state with (Echterhoff et al., 2005, Experiment 2; Echterhoff et al., 2008, 
Experiment 1; Kopietz et al., 2010) such as an out-group audience (Turkish student 
in a German university, trainee in vocational school vs. student in a university, or 
higher status person, see Echterhoff et al., 2005, 2008; Echterhoff et al., 2009). 
Regarding the relational motive for the creation of shared reality, Pinel et al. (2006) 
20 
 
showed that the effect of sharing inner states on participants’ liking of their sharing 
partners was larger when the participants’ need for connectedness was higher.     
Fourth, shared reality must involve a subjective experience of commonality 
with other’s inner state, i.e., the person must be aware that he succeeded in 
establishing a commonality with someone else’s inner state about some aspect in 
the world. This condition emphasizes the subjective experience in creating shared 
reality. Following from this condition, shared reality can be established even if both 
sharers are objectively wrong. What matters is that both perceive a commonality, 
the same subjective perception of the object they share reality about.1 This 
condition has been considered as the most straight-forward to manipulate 
experimentally and also received significant empirical evidence (Echterhoff et al., 
2009). For example, it was shown that when the audience does not identify the 
target based on the message of the communicator, the saying-is-believing effect 
disappears (Hausmann et al., 2008; Echerhoff et al., 2005). In the initial saying-is-
believing study (Higgins & Rholes, 1978) communicators that did not produce a 
message at all (and thus did not create shared reality through interpersonal 
communication with the audience) did not exhibit the saying-is-believing effect.  
Although interpersonal communication is not necessary for the creation of 
shared reality (awareness of someone else’s inner state could be enough) most of 
the empirical research about shared reality so far, stemming from the saying-is-
believing paradigm, has focused on interpersonal communication (Echterhoff et al., 
                                                        
1 Recall the discussion of Stern’s et al. (1985) concept of “affective attunement” in the 
previous section and the apparent similarity between it and the fourth condition for the 
creation of shared reality (i.e. the emphasis on the subjective experience of commonality of 
affective states between caregiver and infant). 
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2009). Ever since the initial saying-is-believing experiment (Higgins & Rholes, 
1978), and especially in the last two decades since the formulation of the saying-is-
believing effect as an event of shared reality (Higgins, 1992), there has been 
extensive empirical evidence regarding the mechanism of shared reality and the 
four necessary abovementioned conditions for it. The two experiments in the 
current research followed all four conditions, albeit with some novelties in 
operationalization and design.  
Related concepts to Shared Reality 
The final part of this review of the literature on shared reality addresses 
several related concepts and the ways in which they differ from shared reality. For 
purposes of this research, it is important to distinguish between shared reality and 
empathy and mood contagion. In empathy (de Vignemont & Singer, 2006; de Waal, 
2008; Gallese, 2003) and mood contagion (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994; 
Neumann & Strack, 2000), similarly to shared reality, people share others’ inner 
states and subjectively experience a commonality between theirs and others’ inner 
states. However, this commonality does not necessarily involve an object or a target 
referent (the phenomena of empathy or mood contagion does not require such 
object or target), thus not satisfying the second condition for the creation of shared 
reality. For example, one can empathize with another person following that person’s 
loss; what would be shared in that example is a feeling of sadness, not the target of 
that sadness (only one person’s loss). Echterhoff et al. (2009) argue that both 
concepts, because of their importance for social sharing, can be considered as 
building blocks for shared reality. In addition, the authors argue that empathy and 
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mood contagion can be regarded as dyadic constellations (between person A and 
person B), while shared reality is a triadic one (person A, person B, target referent).  
Shared reality is also different from perspective taking and theory of mind. 
Although perspective taking satisfies the “aboutness” condition for shared reality, it 
does not satisfy the appropriate motivation condition and does not entail 
experiencing the commonality of inner states. Theory of mind is an important 
developmental human achievement (Higgins & Pittman, 2008; Premack & Woodruff, 
1978) that enables humans to understand others and predict their behavior; 
however, it does not presume necessarily experiencing a commonality between the 
understood inner states. Both concepts (perspective taking and theory of mind), 
similarly to empathy and mood contagion, could be considered as building blocks 
for the creation of shared reality and the ability of humans to socially share.  
Summary of relevant research and literature  
In summary: on the one hand, contemporary clinical research and theory has 
emphasized the relational, interpersonal aspects of emotional experience and 
regulation; on the other hand, the empirical exploration of such elements, and in 
particular the effects of social sharing on emotional processes, seems to be lacking. 
In addition, there is no consensus in the literature regarding the effects of social 
sharing on emotional processes. The concept of shared reality seemed especially apt 
for filling this gap while being used as a an experimental paradigm to study it in the 
current research.    
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CHAPTER III: SHARED REALITY AND EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE AND REGULATION: 
A PILOT STUDY AND TWO SUBSEQUENT STUDIES 
 
The purpose of the current research is to contribute to our understanding of 
the implications of social sharing on emotional experience and regulation, using the 
well-established paradigm of shared reality. For that purpose, two experiments 
were designed to investigate the effects of shared reality on emotional experience 
and regulation. Taken together, these studies may contribute to our understanding 
of shared reality and its general mechanism, as well as to a more specific 
understanding of its effects on the emotional aspects of this situation. These studies 
may also contribute more generally to our understanding of 
relational/interpersonal processes in emotional experience and regulation.  
The pilot and study 1 examined the most basic emotional regulation aspect—
perceived intensity of emotional experience. The pilot is an expansion of an existing 
emotional regulation paradigm—labeling; study 1 adds to this paradigm a shared 
reality condition and serves as an exploratory study of shared reality in the context 
of emotional processes, as will be discussed. Study 2 is more comprehensive, and is 
focusing on the effects of shared reality on multiple aspects of emotional experience 
and regulation, such as intensity of feeling, attachment, positive and negative 








Pilot Study: Affect Labeling 
Method 
Overview 
Although the expression “putting feelings into words” was coined by Freud 
(Breuer & Freud, 1893) as a general depiction of his early psychotherapeutic efforts 
in the treatment of hysteria, the current, experimental, reference is attributed to 
Lieberman (Lieberman, Eisenberger, Crockett, Tom, Pfeifer, & Way, 2007; 
Lieberman, Inagaki, Tabibnia, & Crockett, 2011). Lieberman and his colleagues 
(2007) conducted several experiments that studied the effect of labeling—
emotional (i.e., giving a verbal label to an emotional stimulus, such as a face 
expressing an emotion) and non-emotional—on emotional regulation. The authors 
showed that affect labeling produced a significant disruption of amygdala activity, 
which led to their conclusion that affect labeling diminishes emotional reactivity 
and thus regulates emotion. A subsequent study (Lieberman et al., 2011) 
demonstrated that affect labeling also produced diminished self-report of the 
intensity of emotions (people in the affect labeling condition reported a lessened 
intensity of the stimuli), and that its effect is similar to reappraisal (Ochsner & 
Gross, 2005) or intentional distraction techniques. The authors concluded that affect 
labeling is an incidental and unintentional emotional regulation technique: although 
people are unaware of it (or even think it intensifies emotions) putting feelings into 
words leads to diminished emotional reactivity.  
In the pilot study of the current research, participants watched a series of 
emotionally stimulating images under two conditions—emotional labeling or 
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control (non-emotional labeling). They were asked to rate the intensity of the 
feelings they experienced while watching the images. Labeling was chosen as a 
general paradigm for the purposes of this research, since it is an established 
paradigm of emotional regulation, which could also be easily expanded to include 
the shared reality condition (studies 1 and 2). The basic paradigm that was used in 
the pilot was later applied to the shared reality studies (studies 1 and 2) and hence 
will be described in detail in the procedure section.  
 Based on the Relevance of Representation (ROAR; Eitam & Higgins, 2010) 
theory that postulates that any relevant aspect of a stimulus would be equally 
accessible for psychological processing, and the psychological distancing theory 
(Amit, Algom, & Trope, 2009), it was predicted that a mundane, but relevant, 
labeling of the picture would produce the same psychological distance and thus 
would produce similar regulatory results to affective labeling.  
Participants 
Participants were 59 undergraduates (15 males; mean age of total sample = 
20.27, SD = 3.21) at Columbia University who participated for class credit.    
Stimuli 
Following Kron, Schul, Cohen, and Hassin (2010), twenty moderately 
negative (M = 2.5, SD = 0.5, on a scale of 1-92—from most negative to most positive) 
and moderately arousing (M = 5.5, SD = 0.5, on a scale of 1-9) images from the 
International Affective Picture System were chosen (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & 
                                                        
2 According to IAPS norms for all subjects (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005). 
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Cuthbert, 2005). The images were presented in a single order during the labeling 
task. 
Design and Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups: affect labeling or 
category labeling. The first group (affect labeling) chose one label out of four—Sad, 
Angry, Disgusted, or Scared—that corresponded best to their emotional reaction to 
the picture (see Appendix A1) and said it out loud to an attached microphone. 
Participants were asked to “report the label that best captures your emotional 
response to the picture…and say it out loud to the microphone.” After every image 
that the participants saw and labeled, the participants were instructed to rate the 
intensity of their emotion when looking at the image, “Please rate the intensity of 
your feelings during the time you were looking at the picture,” using a 5-point 
nonverbal pictorial scale based on the Self-Assessment Manikin Scale, which asks 
participants to choose one picture out of five that corresponds best to their intensity 
of feeling, from least intense to most intense (Lang, 1980; see Appendix B). Intensity 
of feeling was measured after every image, thus every participant had twenty 
measurements of intensity.  
The second group (category labeling) chose one label out of four—Person, 
Behavior, Tool, or Action—that corresponded best to their categorization of the 
picture (i.e., the category that best represents the image; see Appendix A2) and said 
it out loud. Participants were asked to “report the label that best captures your 
categorization of the picture…and say it out loud to the microphone.” After choosing 
27 
 
the label, the participants rated the intensity of their emotion on the same 5-point 
nonverbal pictorial scale. 
Results and Discussion 
 Standard linear regression was used to analyze the data. Regarding the main 
task in this study: there was no significant difference between the intensity of 
feelings for the participants in the affect labeling group (M = 3.2, SD = 1.2) and the 
category labeling group (M = 3.9, SD = 1.3), t (58) = -1.45, p = .15. This finding 
suggests that in the current study participants in both labeling conditions 
experienced the same emotional intensity in reaction to the moderately negative 
stimuli they were presented with, and confirmed the hypothesis that affect labeling, 
if an emotional regulation strategy at all, is a part of a more general mechanism of 
labeling and verbalization that dampens negative emotional reaction through 
psychological distance (Amit et al., 2009).  
In a recent study, Kircanski, Lieberman, and Craske (2012) found that affect 
labeling diminished behavioral and physiological but not self-reported measures of 
anxiety (as compared to other regulation strategies such as exposure) and 
concluded that affect labeling might affect behavioral and physiological measures of 
regulation, but not self-reported ones. The findings of this pilot study are consistent 
with this conclusion.   
Additional Data Analysis 
Apart from the main question regarding labeling and intensity, several other 
concepts related to emotional regulation were explored, including possible order 
effect, i.e., whether the same images, if presented in a later order, would produce 
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diminished emotional reactions as a result of habituation or learning (Bradley, Lang, 
& Cuthbertt, 1993). A significant effect of order was indeed found: the same images 
that were presented at a later order elicited less intense responses, t (58) = -2.58, p 
< .01, suggesting that there was a process of “habituation” to the stimuli. In other 
words, when the same image was presented later participants (on average) rated 
the intensity of their emotional reaction to that image as significantly lower; the 
order of the image in itself was affecting the intensity of the emotional reaction to it. 
 Because the data indicated that response time (RT) decreases significantly 
for later images, t (58) = -2.52, p = .015, RT was controlled when analyzing the order 
effect. Even when controlling for RT, the order effect remains, t (58) = -4.75, p < 
.001. However, the interaction between order and condition was not significant, t 
(58) = -1.20, p = .237, meaning that the order in which the images were presented 
affected participants in the affect labeling and category labeling conditions similarly.  
Conclusion 
In summary, two main findings emerged from this study. First, there was no 
significant difference between the two conditions of labeling in their effect on the 
perceived emotional intensity of the images. In addition to the recent finding of 
Kircanski  et al. (2012) that concluded that affect labeling may not be affecting self-
reported measures of emotional regulation, these results—the lack of difference 
between the two conditions of labeling—would have been predicted by at least two 
other models. The “cognitive-load” model (Kron et al., 2010), would have predicted 
that any strategy that uses the same amount of cognitive resources would produce 
the same regulation result, and since there is reason to conclude that participants in 
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both conditions used the same amount of cognitive resources in their labeling, this 
model would have predicted the results found in this pilot study. The psychological 
distance model (Amit et al., 2009), would have also predicted these results, as it 
postulates that any strategy that produces the same psychological distance from the 
stimuli would produce same regulatory effect. In the case of the current research, it 
is definitely plausible that the act of verbalization in itself (which was not present in 
Lieberman’s labeling studies) had a similar distancing effect in both the category 
and affect labeling conditions. Both models provide plausible explanations to these 
findings.  
Second, the significant order effect might be a manifestation of 
“habituation”—a gradual decline of reactivity over time (e.g., Bradley, Lang, & 
Cuthbertt, 1993). The concept, although widely used, was not intensively studied in 
self-reported emotional regulation paradigms to the best of my knowledge (but 
mostly in clinical settings and physiological research, e.g., Jaycoax, Foa, & Morral, 
1998). This pilot study showed a basic emotional regulation mechanism in action: 
exposure to the same stimulus at a later order produced a less intense emotional 
reaction, a finding that seemed worthy of pursuing further in the added shared 
reality conditions. 
The main paradigm of the pilot—two differential conditions of image 
labeling—was preserved in study 1, which examined the additional effect of shared 
reality when added to these labeling conditions.   




Study 1: Labeling and Shared Reality 
Method 
Overview 
Study 1 expanded the paradigm that was introduced in the pilot study to 
include shared reality. Shared reality was added as a within subjects variable both in 
the affect labeling condition (group 1) and in the category labeling condition (group 
2).  
This study created an experimental situation of shared reality and 
investigated its effects on emotional regulation. The main goal of this study was to 
examine whether shared reality functions as an intensifier or regulator of mildly 
negative emotions that are experimentally induced. In addition, study 1 was an 
exploratory study that was designed with study 2 in mind. It was an expansion upon 
the pilot study, which further established the labeling and shared reality paradigm. 
The pilot and study 1 were more exploratory in nature, while study 2 followed 
specific hypotheses that were tested.  
Apart from the establishment of the experimental paradigm of shared reality 
for future use in the more extensive study 2, the main goal in study 1 was to explore 
the effect of shared reality on emotional regulation as would be indicated by the 
participants’ rating of the intensity of their emotional reaction to emotionally 
stimulating images they watched. Since shared reality was not studied in connection 




On the one hand, and based on the clinical literature reviewed (e.g., Schore, 
2009) and research on effects of emotional sharing like the “venting hypothesis” 
(i.e., that “venting” does not necessarily regulates negative emotions; Kennedy-
Moore & Watson, 1999), it seemed plausible that sharing would intensify the 
emotional reaction to the image, especially if the target of the sharing is the labeling 
of the emotion itself. In this regard, it has been hypothesized (though not 
empirically verified) that sharing an emotion (for example, with a therapist) 
intensifies it. In addition, based on the epistemic motive of shared reality—having a 
valid representation of the world and establishing what is real (Higgins, 1992; 2012; 
Hardin & Higgins, 1996)—it could be predicted that in the shared reality condition 
(regardless of the labeling) the emotional rating would be more intense, since it is 
more real: the images were in fact negative.  
On the other hand, based on the same clinical research (e.g., Schore, 2009) 
that stresses the importance of mutuality and attachment in affect regulation, it 
could be predicted that in the shared reality condition the intensity of the negative 
emotions would be lower, since sharing can function as an emotional regulation 
strategy. Since, to the best of my knowledge, the temporality question in successful 
sharing experiences has not been addressed empirically in clinical literature (i.e.. 
when does sharing transforms from potential intensifier of emotions to their 
regulator?), the current study may be the first empirical evidence of the immediate 
(i.e., in the moment) effect of successful sharing on the intensity of negative 
emotional response as measured by participants’ self-report.  
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In summary, no specific hypothesis was formulated in study 1 regarding the 
potential intensification or regulation of feelings for participants in the shared 
reality condition. Rather, and based on the theories described, this study was seen 
as essentially exploratory in nature  
Participants 
Participants were 98 undergraduates (29 males, mean age of overall sample 
= 22.39, SD = 5.01) at Columbia University who participated for class credit.  
Stimuli 
The same twenty moderately negative (M = 2.5, SD = 0.5, on a scale of 1–9) 
and moderately arousing (M = 5.5, SD = 0.5, on a scale of 1–9) images from the IAPS 
(Lang et al., 2005) that were used in the pilot study were used in study 1, as well. 
The images were presented in a single order during the labeling task. 
Design and Procedure 
The study employed a 2 (shared reality vs. no shared reality; within subjects 
variable) X 2 (affect labeling vs category labeling; between subjects variable) 
factorial design.  
Participants were randomized between the same two groups as in the pilot 
study: the affect labeling group (group 1) and the category labeling group (group 2). 
In the beginning of the study participants were told that there was another 
participant who would hear the label that they would share (participants chose a 
label from the same 4 labels, in each condition, as in the pilot study; the label that 
they chose was said out loud by using an attached microphone) and would have to 
choose between two images based on their labeling.  
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The participants were told the following: “Another participant who has two 
pictures to choose from, will hear you and will try to identify the picture you saw 
based on the category/feeling you reported. If the participant succeeds you will see 
a green colored screen; if the participant fails you will see a red screen.” In the 
shared reality condition, the participants were led to believe that another 
participant was able to choose the same image as they had, based on their reported 
label, thus implying that they shared their perception of the picture.  
Participants were informed that the other participant (in reality, a computer) 
would choose between only two stimuli, to make the event seem more realistic and 
plausible, i.e., the ability of another person to choose an image based on one (albeit 
very relevant) word. A computer rather than an actual person was used as “another 
participant” in the study since an actual person could have created an element of 
possible in/out group “contamination” of the manipulation that would have been 
impossible to control for in this study; the shared reality effect disappears when the 
other participant is perceived as an “out-group” member (Echterhoff et al., 2005, 
2009). Thus, a collaborator could not have been used instead of a computer 
(although it would have made the manipulation much more realistic), as it would 
have been impossible to control for potential out-group perceptions of the other 
participant, which could have eliminated the effect of shared reality.  
In the not shared reality condition, the participants were led to believe that 
the other participant could not choose the image based on their labeling, thus 
implying that they did not share the same perception of the picture, whether in the 
emotional or categorical labeling condition.  
34 
 
The red and green screens that were indications of shared vs. not shared 
reality were randomized: every participant saw 10 of each in a random order (the 
reasons as well as limitations of this procedure will be discussed further). After 
seeing either a red or green screen (thus, only after learning whether they created 
shared reality with another participant or not), the participants rated the intensity 
of their feelings using the same SAM scale as in the pilot study.  
The manipulation in this study achieved the four requisites of shared reality 
(Echterhoff et al., 2009). First, the event was subjectively perceived as sharing—the 
participants were led to believe that they and someone else share the same thematic 
or emotional categorization of a particular image—and they did not, for example, 
feel that they simply imitated someone else or behaved “as if” they shared the same 
perception. Second, the shared reality was about a target: the IAPS image. Third, 
since the sharing was “unintentional” and with no specific goal (e.g., promotion, 
liking) it can be assumed that the motivation was either epistemic or relational, as 
was demonstrated in previous studies that explored the motivational aspects of 
shared reality (Echterhoff et al., 2005; Echterhoff et al., 2008; Kopietz et al., 2010).  
Fourth, the experience of “success” was directly manipulated in this study: 
participants either believed that they shared reality (had the same response to an 
image) or not.  
Despite fulfilling the four prerequisites for shared reality, this experiment 
expanded the established “communication game” paradigm to include emotional 
sharing, which was not done before; this may have created an “emotional sharing 
game” paradigm (certainly in the affect labeling condition) in which the target of the 
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sharing was one’s own reaction to an emotional stimulus and not an evaluation of an 
external target, and in which the studied effect was the emotional aspect of sharing 
and not the previously studied epistemic and relational ones.  
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation Check 
 Since the study employed a deception (misleading participants to believe 
that there was another participant, while in reality the computer randomized the 
responses), a manipulation check was added to assess whether the participants 
believed the deception or not. There is no published work on appropriate 
procedures for manipulation checks for shared reality research. However, based on 
consultations with three shared reality researchers (Rene Kopietz and Gerald 
Echterhoff, in Germany and Shira Mor, in New York) a particular manipulation check 
was used. It was more explicit than the German version (used by Kopietz and 
Echterhoff) and more in line with the American version (used by Mor). A free-verbal 
format for the response was used and after the completion of the experiment 
participants were asked the following: “For half the participants there was another 
participant (who guessed the pictures); for the other half there was not. Which 
condition do you think you were in?” And then, “If you answered that you think you 
were in a condition without the other participant, when did you think first think 
that? During the experiment, or now when questioned?”  
A total of 57 participants (58.1%) responded that they were in a condition 
with another participant, 17 more (17.34%) responded that they thought they did 
not have another participant only when questioned. This left 24 participants 
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(24.48%) that thought that 1) there was not another participant and 2) that they 
thought about it during the experiment itself (and not after, when asked). However, 
this percentage could perhaps be explained by the explicit nature of the 
manipulation check—it is possible that the question itself prompted their doubts. In 
fact, many of the “non-believers” reported that they expected to be “deceived” in 
psychological experiments and the question might have prompted them to reaffirm 
their beliefs. In addition, although the number of the non-believers is higher than in 
shared reality research in Germany, it is lower than in experiments led by colleagues 
in New York (Echterhoff and Kopietz, personal communication, October 2012; Mor, 
personal communication, October 2012). More importantly, eliminating this group 
did not affect the results of the first study (to be discussed), perhaps because the 
“non-believers” were in fact doubters.  
Standard ANOVA and linear regression techniques were used to analyze the 
data. As in the pilot, no significant difference in the perceived intensity of emotions 
between the affect labeling and the category labeling group was found, t (97) = 1.50, 
p = .14. This non-effect remained even after controlling for shared reality (p = .42), 
providing additional evidence that affect labeling (if a regulation strategy at all) 
might be part of a more general labeling mechanism as was discussed earlier.  
The order effect was replicated. As in the pilot study, the data indicated that 
the same images, if presented at a later order, resulted in lower ratings of intensity 
of emotions, t (97) = -3.51, p < .01. Also, as in the pilot study, the interaction 
between order and labeling condition was not significant, t (97) = -0.76, p = .45.  
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Regarding shared reality: there was a main effect of shared reality on 
perceived intensity of emotions. Participants in the shared reality condition 
reported significantly higher intensity of emotions (M = 3.25) than participants in 
the not shared reality condition (M = 3.09); t (97) = 2.71, p < .01. This finding would 
be in the direction of the prediction based on the epistemic motive of shared reality: 
perceived intensity of emotions “should” be higher in the shared reality condition, 
as it was more “real;” the images were negative (Higgins, 1992; Hardin & Higgins, 
1996).  
The interaction between shared reality and labeling was not significant, t 
(97) = 1.06, p = 30. As discussed in the literature review, it seems reasonable to 
assume that a specific focus on emotions when sharing them would produce an 
intensification of affect—in the case of the current study, to expect a specific 
interaction between affect labeling and shared reality. However, this was not the 
case with these findings—there was no significant difference between the 
conditions, and the only significant effect that was found was the main effect of 
shared reality (no interaction with labeling).  
The non-interaction between shared reality and labeling would not be 
predicted by clinical theory; however, it would be in line with the ROAR (Eitam & 
Higgins, 2010) theory prediction, since the negative affect is activated and 
accessible in both conditions, and since successfully sharing any relevant aspect of 
the image should intensify the activated affect (in the case of current study, either 
the category or the emotion). This non-interaction informed further exploration and 
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(in part) the design of the second study, attempting to solidify the relevance aspect 
of the mechanism of shared reality, as will be discussed. 
An additional significant finding was the interaction between shared reality 
and order effect, t (97) = 2.81, p < .01. Participants in the shared reality condition 
showed significantly less decease in the intensity of negative emotion with repeated 
exposure than participants in the not shared reality condition. This finding suggests 
that shared reality not only intensifies emotional reaction to negative stimuli, but 
also maintains negative affect, since the order effect ceases to be significant for 
participants who shared reality. This finding seems to emphasize even more the 
strength of the shared reality effect, as it is not reversed or nullified by a regulatory 
process that was identified earlier in the current research: the order effect.  
The finding that shared reality intensifies and maintains the short-term 
emotional reaction to negative stimuli stands in contrast to clinical intuition and 
research that argues for the psychological benefits and emotional regulatory 
consequences of successful sharing (e.g., Pennebaker et al., 2001; Schore, 2009). In 
the experimental situation that was created, successfully sharing a (relevant) 
perception of a moderately negative stimulus with an anonymous person, the 
sharing intensified the emotional reaction; it did not regulate it. A question that was 
not explored in the current research, but seems important for future research is 
whether the effect would be different if the sharing would occur with a person that 
the participants actually saw or knew. Shared reality has never been studied among 
people who know each other; however, this finding suggests that such exploration 
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might be necessary for better understanding of the emotional effects of shared 
reality and its operating mechanism.  
There are many questions regarding the clinical implications of this finding. 
For example, could sharing a negative emotion with the therapist have an 
intensifying effect in the beginning of treatment but then gradually (as the patient 
gets to know the therapist) reverse and become regulatory? Should clinicians be 
aware of this effect when encouraging their patients to share a relevant, negative 
emotional reaction? Perhaps by doing so, by acknowledging the possible trend of 
“things become worst before they become better”—that emotions become more 
intense when initially shared but then, with the effect of habituation (order in this 
study)—clinicians might succeed in regulating the intensity of their patients’ 
emotions. These questions are outside of the scope of current research; however, 
the shared reality design that was introduced in this research could be replicated in 
other settings to explore them.  
Perhaps similarly to the use of virtual reality in trauma treatment (e.g., 
Olasov-Rothbaum, Ruef, Litz, Han, & Hodges, 2004), the shared reality design could 
be used in creating a situation of sharing (with the therapist being the audience) of 
negative stimuli that are relevant to patients’ lives in a controlled, monitored 
setting. Different conditions of sharing and different clinical populations could be 
investigated in an attempt to understand better the effects of shared reality on 







Summary of the pilot and study 1 and implementations for study 2 
  
Study 1 and the pilot examined the effects of labeling and shared reality on 
emotional regulation, while focusing on the most basic aspect of regulation: 
perceived intensity of emotions. These studies used a paradigm to study emotional 
regulation that included two concepts (labeling and shared reality) which could be 
used in future studies to expand further our understanding of shared reality, 
emotional regulation, and emotional experience.   
The pilot study examined whether affect labeling affects emotional reactivity 
differently than another type of labeling, category labeling. Moreover, the pilot study 
provided the basis of the paradigm for the two subsequent studies in this research 
that also included shared reality. Both goals of the pilot were achieved: the basic 
design of visual presentation of stimuli, labeling of the stimuli, and sharing them 
provided the basis for both subsequent studies and can be easily used and adapted 
to future studies of shared reality and emotional experience and regulation.  
Study 1 examined how shared reality, when introduced as an addition to the 
labeling conditions, affects emotional regulation to negative stimuli. Although the 
manipulation of shared reality that was introduced in study 1 was not used in the 
past (computer feedback from a perceived “audience;” using red vs. green screens), 
the manipulation achieved the four requisites of a shared reality manipulation that 
were discussed earlier (Echterhoff et al., 2009). The pilot and study 1 produced 
several significant findings and had several limitations. In what follows, I discuss 
both and also discuss the limitations that were addressed when designing study 2.  
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Several general findings emerged. First, the pilot and study 1 established that 
affect labeling does not attenuate negative emotional responses more (or less) than 
another form of labeling, category labeling. As mentioned, this could be an 
indication that labeling might be a general mechanism of emotional regulation (via 
either cognitive load or psychological distraction), and affect labeling is only a 
manifestation of that general mechanism (a proposition that Lieberman et al., 2011, 
advanced as well).  
Second, and most importantly, study 1 showed that shared reality intensifies 
and maintains immediate emotional reactions to negative stimuli. The difference 
between the shared reality and the not shared reality condition was rather small (d 
< .3); however, it is the first experimental indication that shared reality intensifies 
emotional reaction to negative stimuli. Future studies can further clarify the 
conditions and mechanisms of operation of shared reality in regard to emotional 
processes; in fact, study 2 of the current research serves as such an attempt.   
Third, the pilot and study 1 showed an order effect. Same images produced 
less intense emotional responses if they were presented later. Despite this finding 
being somewhat “intuitive”—one can think of the concept of habituation or 
“learning” that would predict such results—there seems to be little if any research 
that shows self-reported attenuation of emotional responses over time. The main 
focus of the research thus far has been the physiological effects of habituation 
(showing that bodily responses to negative stimuli attenuate over time; Bradley et 
al., 1993), or the clinical use of habituation, for example as a treatment to trauma in 
which continual exposure to traumatic stimuli leads to attenuation of the emotional 
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responses to the stimuli (Jaycox et al., 1998). The order effect seems to be rather 
robust and was replicated in study 1; that is, not disappearing with the introduction 
of shared reality. Future studies may further expand on this effect, and focus on the 
mechanism itself in trying to better understand whether it is indeed habituation or 
emotional learning, for example. The order effect was addressed in the second study 
as well. 
Implementations and Modifications for Study 2  
 First, and in regard to the manipulation of shared reality, the choice to 
randomize shared reality and not shared reality condition with 10 presentations of 
each image in the first study was problematic. Although data analysis did not 
indicate that the first two or three shared reality/not shared reality manipulations 
produced significantly different results than the 10 together, prior research suggests 
that people would most likely assume that there is a shared reality in a 
manipulation like that in this study, and thus after a few unsuccessful attempts in 
sharing might experience a sense of failure in establishing shared reality (see 
Kopietz et al., 2010 for discussion of this topic).  
This limitation was addressed in the second study by manipulating shared 
reality between and not within groups, with the successful shared reality reflecting 
a 80/20 ratio, and with the first three images being successfully shared in the 
shared reality condition. In addition, and following the responses of the participants 
to the manipulation check, a “booster” to the manipulation was added: a live chat 
(with a Google chat technology, “gchat”) that was performed with a research 
assistant. This was designed to increase the belief that there was in fact another 
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participant (and not a computer) with whom the participants shared or did not 
share reality. This booster has never been used before and represents another 
additional feature of this study to the established shared reality design and 
operationalization.     
Second, and since the effect of shared reality was examined on negative 
stimuli only (and in fact, on quite distinct negative stimuli), study 2 examined the 
effects of shared reality on emotionally ambivalent stimuli. As much (perhaps most) 
of emotional life is experienced ambivalently and ambiguously, study 2 focused on 
the effects of shared reality on such stimuli and examined the potential differences 
and similarities between them and the negative stimuli that were studied in the first 
study.  To the best of my knowledge, this (the effects of sharing ambivalent stimuli 
on emotional regulation) has not been done previously in emotional regulation 
research. However, prior shared reality research mostly focused on ambiguous 
targets of sharing (recall the ambivalent target in the initial saying-is-believing 
study; Higgins & Rholes, 1978) and suggested that people who achieve shared 
reality gain more certainty about the ambivalent objects of sharing and remember 
what they shared rather than what they initially learned about the object 
(Echterhoff et al., 2005; Kopeitz et al., 2010).  
Third, following the finding that the interaction between labeling and shared 
reality was not significant even when there was a significant effect of shared reality, 
study 2 further examined how shared reality can affect emotional reactivity, 
regardless of the content that is shared. In other words, study 2 was designed to test 
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whether the effect of shared reality would be significant regardless of the content 
that is shared, as long as this content is relevant to the stimulus.  
Fourth, study 2 manipulated the “aboutness” (recall that it is one of the 
requisites for shared reality) more effectively. As will be described in the procedure 
section (below), participants were given more freedom in choosing their labels, 
making it more representative of sharing in the real world and also closer to the 
initial saying-is-believing paradigm.  
Fifth, more dependent measures that examined additional emotional effects 
of shared reality were added in study 2. For example, this study was designed to 
examine whether (as would be predicted by clinical literature, e.g., Linehan, 1993; 
Stern, 2004), despite a higher rating of emotional intensity in the shared reality 
condition, the subjective well-being of participants who successfully shared their 
reality would also be rated as higher. In other words, whether the mechanism of 
sharing simultaneously intensifies the perceived emotion and the subjective well-
being (even if the intensified shared emotion is negative, as in study 1).  
Lastly, study 1 proposed that there is a main effect of shared reality, but did 
not offer the mechanism that might drive this effect. Study 2 was designed to test 
such possible mechanisms based on previous literature and in line with the 
paradigm that was developed in this research. Several measures that tested the 
concepts of “realness,” relevance, and certainty, were introduced. All these measures 
are proposed to constitute the operational mechanism of shared reality 
(independent of the emotional processes).  
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CHAPTER IV: STUDY 2: SHARED REALITY AND EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE 
Method 
Overview 
Stemming from the results of the first study and the pilot, and the literature 
that was reviewed, study 2 was designed to further examine the effects of shared 
reality on emotional experience and regulation. The second study was based on the 
paradigm that was developed in the first study and the pilot: presentation of images, 
their labeling, and a manipulation of shared reality. The second study was divided 
into two sections: an initial pilot section, which was designed to choose the 10 most 
appropriate (i.e., ambiguous) images for the study, and an experimental section, 
which used these images in the manipulation of shared reality.  
Since the second study was designed to examine the effects of shared reality 
on ambiguous stimuli, the main goal of the pilot section was to choose the most 
ambiguous stimuli from the IAPS images—images that produced both negative and 
positive responses from participants. Based on the average rating of valence that is 
available in the IAPS (Lang et al., 2005), 20 neutral images were chosen for the pilot; 
participants rated their valence and the 10 most ambiguous were chosen for the 
experimental section. 
The experiment section of study 2 used the 10 most ambiguous images from 
the pilot. There were four groups in the study: shared reality (in category vs. 
affective labeling conditions), and not shared reality (in category vs. affective 
labeling conditions). Shared reality was manipulated similarly to study 1: 
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participants were led to believe that another participant was either successful or not 
in identifying the image the participants’ saw based on their labeling of the image.   
Pilot Phase 
In the pilot phase 30 participants (10 males; overall mean age = 25.43, SD = 
4.85) watched 20 neutral images from the IAPS in terms of valence (M = 5, SD = 0.5, 
on a scale of 1–9) and arousal (M = 4.5, SD = 0.5, on a scale of 1–9). Based on the 
input of colleagues in the field, the 20 images that were chosen were evaluated not 
only as neutral but also as potentially ambiguous, i.e., for some people positive and 
for others negative (such as the image of bees for example, or an expressionless 
man; see Appendix E). This initial pool of 20 images was reduced to the 10 most 
ambiguous ones, based on participants’ ratings.  
The images were presented in a single order during the task. Each image was 
displayed for 8 seconds. The participants were then asked to determine whether the 
image was more “positive” or “negative,” on a scale from -5 (“extremely negative”) 
to +5 (“extremely positive”). Since the images were neutral, participants did not 
have a 0 option (as it would have been the natural choice for most participants given 
the images’ average valence value); thus, participants had to choose whether the 
image seemed more positive or negative to them.  
In addition, the decision not to include the 0 option was made with the 
shared reality condition in the experimental phase of the study in mind: including 
the 0 option would have made the future manipulation of shared reality improbable, 
as the ability of “another participant” to choose an image based on a 0 response 
would not seem realistic or possible. The image had to be rated as either more 
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positive or more negative, even if slightly so, to make the manipulation of choice 
seem probable and realistic.  
Results of the Pilot Phase 
The main goal of the pilot phase was achieved. The 10 images that produced 
the most polarizing results were chosen. Although no image produced a perfect split 
of 50/50 in terms of negative/positive responses between participants, each of the 
10 images chosen had a polarizing effect, with the best ratio being 46/54 




The 10 most ambiguous images based on the ratings from the pilot phase 
were chosen for the experiment. The study expanded the exploration of the effects 
of shared reality on emotional experience and well-being to include additional 
dependent variables, and added several measurements of well-being and 
attachment to the existing intensity rating measure, while maintaining the basic 
structure of the design from the previous studies: presentation of images, their 
rating, their labeling (affective vs. categorical), and creation of shared reality based 
on the labeling.  
The additional emotional measurements were chosen since 1) they measure 
central aspects of emotional experience (e.g., attachment), the focus of this research, 




The stimuli in this study was changed from negative to ambiguous to provide 
additional data on the effects of shared reality in a context of a different valence of 
emotional experience. In addition, since shared reality is proposed to be a 
mechanism of establishing what is real and certain in the otherwise ambiguous 
reality (Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Kopeitz et al., 2010), the study sought to examine 
that element in the emotional context, as that has never been done before. Measures 
of “realness,” relevance, and epistemic certainty were added in the second study, to 
understand better that mechanism.  
Participants 
Based on the average difference of self-reported intensity of emotions 
between the shared reality and no shared reality conditions in study 1, it was 
calculated that in order to achieve an effect size of d = 0.8 ~60 participants per cell 
were needed, resulting in a total of ~240 participants. The actual number of 
participants in study 2 was 239 (76 males; overall mean age = 23.20, SD = 4.12.  
Design and Procedure 
The study employed a 2 (shared reality vs. no shared reality; between 
subjects) X 2 (affect labeling vs. category labeling; between subjects) factorial 
design. 
Based on the results of the manipulation check in the first study, an 
additional “booster” was added to make the presence of “another participant” more 
believable for participants. Throughout the study there were two research 
assistants present at all times. One of the assistants welcomed the participants, 
instructed them on the procedures of the study, and handed them the post-
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experiment questionnaires. The other assistant sat in a rear room (and was not 
visible to the participants). Before the experiment began, the participants were 
asked to open the Google-chat program on the computer and were told that when 
the other participant would be ready, they would receive a message from them and 
would be asked to reply when they were ready. In reality, it was the other assistant 
who sent a message on the chat stating that he/she is ready (the gender was not 
stated in the message purposefully, and the participants could not know the gender 
of the participant). Messages were very short (few words) and were slightly 
changed from participant to participant to make the interaction seem more genuine. 
The messages were casual, friendly communications, such as “Hi, I am ready, tell me 
when you are so we can begin.” This “boost” has never been used in shared reality 
research, in part because it was assumed that such an interaction might make 
participants feel closer to the imagined participant (Kopietz, personal 
communication, October 2012)—an artifact that would have been beneficial for the 
purposes of this study, as it had the potential to make the computerized interaction 
seem more realistic and human.   
After exchanging messages with “another participant” via chat, participants 
viewed a series of 10 IAPS images that were presented in a single, randomized order 
during the task. Each image was displayed for 8 seconds. In the affect labeling 
condition the participants were asked to indicate whether the image was more 
“positive” or “negative,” on a scale from -5 (“extremely negative”) to +5 (“extremely 
positive”). In the category labeling condition, the participants were asked to choose 
whether the image was more “active” or “passive,” on a scale from -5 (“extremely 
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passive”) to +5 (“extremely active”). “Passive” vs. “active” categories were chosen as 
they fulfilled the following criteria: 1) they were relevant (Eitam & Higgins, 2010) 
and applicable to the stimuli presented and to sharing, and 2) they were orthogonal 
and continuous (Tversky & Hemenway, 1984; so it could parallel the valence in the 
affective labeling condition and could be rated in a continuous scale). It was almost 
impossible to select a category that would satisfy the two above-mentioned criteria 
that would have been completely free from emotional connotation. However, and 
although in general “active” has an emotionally more positive connotation than 
“passive” (Bradley & Lang, 1990), in the context of the stimuli that were used (see 
Appendix E), it is believed that it was not an emotionally loaded distinction, such as 
would have been the case for pleasant/unpleasant, familiar/unfamiliar, good/bad, 
dangerous/safe, etc.   
After viewing all 10 images, participants were presented with the same 
images again in a random order and were asked to rate the intensity of their feelings 
regarding each image on the SAM scale—the same scale that was used in the first 
study and the pilot. In addition, the participants were asked, for every image, to rate 
how real and engaging were the depicted events in the picture. Participants’ 
perceptions of “realness” and engagement were measured as possible indicators of 
the operating mechanism for shared reality (as will be explained in the hypotheses 
section). As “realness” and engagement have been studied in the context of shared 
reality in the past, the questions from Higgins, Franks, Sehnert, Manely, & Pavarini 
(2013) were used:  “I could easily imagine the events depicted in the picture taking 
place’’; ‘‘I could picture myself in the scene of the events depicted in the picture; ‘‘I 
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was mentally involved in assessing the picture while viewing it’’; ‘‘The events 
depicted in the picture are relevant to my everyday life’’. Each item was answered 
on a scale of -3 (“not at all”) to +3 (“very much”). Finally, to measure the epistemic 
certainty of the participants regarding their perceptions of the images—an 
additional proposed feature of the operational mechanism of shared reality—
participants were asked to depict the events in every image (as a free verbal 
response) and then to rate how certain they were about their depiction on a scale of 
-3 (“not at all”) to +3 (“very much”).  
Shared reality was manipulated by reporting to “another participant” after 
every image whether it was more positive or negative (affect labeling condition), or 
more active or passive (category labeling condition). Shared reality was 
manipulated similarly to the first study: providing participants with feedback 
regarding successful vs. unsuccessful identification of the image by “another 
participant” using a red vs. green screen. The exact wording of the instructions was 
the following: “Another participant who has two pictures to choose from will try to 
identify the picture you saw based on your rating. If the other participant succeeds 
you will see a green screen; if the participant fails you will see a red screen.” In 
reality, and similarly to the first study, there was no other participant, and the 
responses were generated by a computer. Following Echterhoff (personal 
communication, October 2012) and in order to increase the power of the 
manipulation, the ratio that was chosen for the shared reality condition was 80/20 
successful identification (i.e., 8 green screens that symbolized correct identification 
of the image vs. 2 green screen that symbolized incorrect identification; as opposed 
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to the 50/50 ratio in study 1); and 20/80 successful identification in the not shared 
reality condition. The ratio was programmed in such a way that the first and the last 
feedback in the shared reality condition were always positive. This decision 
stemmed (as mentioned earlier) from the understanding that people expect to share 
reality; hence the study was designed to not create an experience of failure at the 
outset, which could potentially undermine the shared reality condition (Kopietz et 
al., 2010).  
After the completion of the task, the participants were asked to complete two 
questionnaires, measuring their well-being and the quality of their attachment, and 
answer a question about their global life satisfaction. All of which, as was mentioned 
earlier and will be further discussed in the hypotheses sections, were expected to be 
affected by shared reality.  
Additional Measures 
After the completion of the experiment, the participants were asked to 
complete the following two questionnaires, measuring well-being and attachment: 
Well-being scale. The brief Positive and Negative Affect Schedule, PANAS, 
questionnaire (Watson & Clark, 1994; see Appendix C) was chosen to measure well-
being. It is a widely used and well-validated questionnaire (the alpha reliabilities for 
both scales are high, generally ranging from .83 to .90 for Positive Affect, and from 
.85 to .90 for Negative Affect) that measures both positive and negative affects, 
asking participants to rate to what extent they feel as the word (e.g., happy, sad) 
indicates. There are 10 words that describe positive affective states (e.g., proud, 
enthusiastic) and 10 words that describe negative ones (e.g., guilty, afraid), thus 
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allowing measurement of both positive and negative affects as indicators of well-
being.  Apart from being well researched, frequently used in the past, and relatively 
brief, this questionnaire was chosen because it is validated for use as a state 
measure, i.e., measuring well-being in the present moment (see Watson & Clark, 
1994 for a discussion of the convergent and discriminant validities of the measure 
with other state affective measures); by contrast, most well-being questionnaires 
assess well-being over a period of a week or two and not in the moment. An 
additional advantage of the PANAS is that it has extensive data on normative levels 
of well-being in healthy populations, to which the results can be compared.  
In addition to the PANAS scale, participants were also asked a general, global 
well-being question: “How satisfied are you with your life right now?” The response 
scale ranged from -3 (“not at all”) to +3 (“very much”). 
Attachment scale. Most attachment scales are targeted at specific attachments 
(usually with parents or relationship partners; Ravitz, Maunder, Hunter, Sthankiya, 
& Lancee, 2010); however, for the purposes of this study a general scale—that is, 
not specific to certain people in the participants’ lives—was needed to measure the 
attachment quality as a general state that would be potentially affected by shared 
reality. Based on the review of the content and psychometric qualities of current 
attachment scales by Ravitz et al. (2010), the Measure of Attachment Qualities, MAQ 
was chosen (Carver, 1997; see Appendix D). The MAQ has 14 items. Each item is a 
statement to which participants indicate the degree of their agreement, ranging 
from 1 = “not at all” to 4 = “extremely.” The MAQ loads on three scales, which are 
categories of attachment: secure, avoidant, and anxious-ambivalent. The measure 
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has not been researched as much as some of the more established specific 
attachment measures, but produced adequate internal consistency (with alpha 
reliabilities at .83 for the first two scales and .66 for the third scale; see Kim & 
Carver, 2007; Kim, Carver, Deci, & Kasser, 2008).    
Hypotheses 
There were several hypotheses and research questions proposed in the second 
experiment:  
Hypothesis 1: Shared reality will produce more intense emotional ratings of 
the images.  
The participants were asked to choose a rating for the images in both the 
affect and the category labeling condition. According to this hypothesis, their ratings 
of intensity will converge around their initial chosen ratings, instead of being simply 
neutral. Thus, if a participant would rate the image as more positive and would 
share reality with this rating, it was predicted that he would rate the image as more 
emotionally intense than a participant who did not share reality and thus will rate 
the image as more neutral. This prediction was based on the assumption that what 
is real and relevant (Eitam & Higgins, 2010) in this scenario would be the shared 
reality of the picture—that is the chosen rating, promoting higher levels of intensity, 
since the choice had been made and the reality of the image was not neutral 
anymore. As mentioned, participants were forced to choose a valence (rating the 
images as either positive or negative), as it was evaluated to be the only viable way 
to establish shared reality using current design (choosing an image with a 0 rating, 
as a manipulation of shared reality, seemed improbable). In doing so, it was 
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predicted that shared reality would make participants’ choice seem more real and 
thus intensify their emotional reaction to the stimulus; in a sense, making “the 
positive seem more positive, and the negative more negative.”  
Research question 1: The ratings of intensity in shared reality will not be 
affected by the labeling condition.  
Since in both the affect and category labeling conditions the sharing is about 
something relevant to the image, it was predicted that similarly to the results of the 
first study there would be no interaction between shared reality and labeling in the 
rating of the intensity of the image. The results in study 1 (as well as the research 
that supports them and was discussed above) suggested that there would not be a 
significant interaction between the labeling condition and shared reality.  
Hypothesis 2: Shared reality will make the events in the image seem more 
real and engaging.  
Since shared reality establishes what is real, and based on the results of 
previous studies that examined the effects of shared reality for ambiguous stimuli 
(e.g., Echterhoff et al., 2005; Kopeitz et al., 2010) it was predicted that in the shared 
reality condition participants would rate the events depicted in the images as more 
real and engaging, as measured by the “realness” questions (Higgins et al., 2013). 
Further, it was predicted that this effect would be produced in both labeling 
conditions similarly, since it was proposed that whenever a relevant aspect of the 
stimulus (image) is shared, the entire stimulus (image) should seem more real. 
Although shared reality theory proposes that shared reality makes the events seem 
more real and relevant, this has not been shown empirically before. An additional 
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reason to test this hypothesis lies in the assumption that this situation is the further 
possible elucidation of the operational mechanism of shared reality that would also 
be relevant to emotional research: shared reality was proposed to operate through 
making stimuli (including emotional stimuli) seem more real and relevant.  
Hypothesis 3: Shared reality will promote epistemic certainty.  
It was predicted that participants in the shared reality condition would be 
more certain regarding their depiction of the events in the images as a result of 
sharing reality about their evaluation of the images. Although this would follow 
previous results in shared reality research (see Kopietz, et al., 2010), this effect 
(similarly to the previous hypothesis) has been proposed theoretically but never 
reported empirically. It was proposed that certainty is an additional element of the 
operational mechanism of shared reality: shared reality makes people more certain 
about the stimuli they perceive (i.e., their perceived reality).  
Hypothesis 4: Shared reality will promote subjective well-being.  
It was predicted that participants in the shared reality condition, regardless 
of the labeling condition, would report higher levels of well-being, as measured by 
the PANAS questionnaire. As discussed earlier, there is a vast clinical literature that 
argues for the importance of successful sharing of one’s inner state for one’s 
subjective sense of well-being (see Linehan, 1993; Stern, 2004). It was hypothesized 
that successfully establishing shared reality would promote well-being regardless of 
the condition (affective vs. categorical labeling), so that a main effect of shared 
reality would be found. Stemming from the results of study 1, it was proposed that 
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even if the intensity of (negative) emotional reaction increases for people who share 
reality (as was shown in study 1), their subjective well-being could increase as well.  
The combination of the results of study 1 and the hypothesized results of 
study 2 aimed to demonstrate that shared reality creates a somewhat paradoxical 
state, in which feeling something intensely, even if negative, but being able to 
successfully share it, might increase the subjective well-being associated with the 
intense feeling. Perhaps pointing to a parallel emotional mechanism of shared 
reality: intensifier of emotions and of subjective sense of well-being, even if the 
emotions that were shared were negative. This hypothesis was not tested in study 1, 
so even if it would be supported in study 2, its application to negative stimuli would 
only be a conjecture, as the stimuli in study 2 were ambiguous.    
Hypothesis 5: Shared reality will promote secure attachment.  
Similarly to the previous hypothesis, it was proposed that regardless of the 
content of sharing, successful establishment of shared reality would promote 
participants’ sense of secure attachment. Since attachment phenomena have been 
described as “state-dependent traits” (Ravitz et al., 2010) it was predicted that 
creating shared reality (a specific, emotionally positive state) regardless of the 
labeling condition, would produce higher rating of secure attachment: people in the 
shared reality condition would have a higher score on the security category of the 
attachment scale than people who did not share reality, regardless of the labeling 
condition. This prediction was perhaps more ambitious than the previous ones, as it 
was not certain that the manipulation of shared reality was powerful enough in this 
study to affect such a stable measure as secure attachment. Even though attachment 
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can be affected by specific states that are induced experimentally and even though 
the measure chosen was shown to be sensitive to somewhat similar manipulations 
in the past, it was not clear whether the brief state of shared reality that was 
induced would produce a powerful enough effect to be registered by this measure.  
Research question 2: The order effect will disappear.  
It was predicted that the order effect that was consistent in the first study 
and the pilot would disappear. As discussed earlier, the order effect that was found 
is understood in the context of this research to indicate a process of habituation of 
the participants to negative stimuli that they were exposed to. Since the stimuli in 
the second study were neutral, it was predicted that the intensity of the response to 
them should not change with time—there was not a habituation process that was 
expected to happen.   
Results of the Second Study 
Manipulation Check 
The Google-chat “boost” that was introduced in the second study did not 
eliminate completely the “non-believers”; however, it increased the believers. The 
percentages were as follows: 156 participants (65.3%) indicated that they believed 
that there was another participant; 46 participants (19.2%) indicated that they did 
not think that there was another participant, but that they thought about it only 
when asked; 37 participants (15.5%) reported that they did not believe that there 
was another participant and that they thought about it during the experiment.  
As was suggested in study 1, it is possible that the direct question used in 
current research might have produced a relatively high number of non-believers. 
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Further, if a participant does not believe that there is another participant after 
chatting in real time with them before the experiment, it seems that there is little (if 
anything) that can be done to enhance the number of believers using the current 
research paradigm. The only alternative is to actually see the other person, which, as 
will be discussed, has not been done in shared reality research because of the 
potential perception of the other participant as a member of the “out” group, which 
eliminates the effect of shared reality (Echterhoff et al., 2005, 2009).  
Hypothesis 1:  
The hypothesis was not supported.  
There was no significant difference between the intensity of participants’ 
ratings in the shared reality vs. not shared reality condition, t (238) = -0.56, p = .58. 
As the participants chose between either a positive or negative valence for each 
image in the affective labeling condition, a further analysis was conducted, in which 
responses were divided to two groups: affect-positive and affect-negative. However, 
this division had no effect: shared reality did not intensify the ratings of feelings. It is 
believed that this lack of difference might be due to the fact that the images were in 
fact neutral, and the (forced) choice of valence by participants did not change their 
perception of them as essentially neutral. 
Since the stimuli in the second experiment were neutral, and did not produce 
strong emotional reactions, it allows a comparison with the first experiment, in 
which shared reality intensified the emotional reaction to negative stimuli. Perhaps 
the relative neutrality of the stimuli in the second experiment dictated the 
disappearance of the effect: what was real and relevant was the neutrality of the 
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stimuli, which was intensified in the direction of the prediction of the participants in 
the shared reality condition, contrary to prediction. However, an important 
conclusion can be drawn from the two experiments combined: that shared reality 
intensifies emotional reaction to negative stimuli, but not to neutral (even if 
ambiguous) ones. Future studies can examine whether the same intensification 
happens for positive stimuli as well (it would be predicted, based on the results of 
this and previous research).  
Research question 1:  
The prediction of this research question was supported.  
Based on the first two experiments, the prediction was made that even if a 
significant difference in the intensity rating between the shared reality and the not 
shared reality conditions was found (and it was not; hypothesis 1), a difference 
between the affect labeling and category labeling conditions would still not be 
found. The hypothesis was supported and there was no difference between the two 
labeling conditions, t (238) = 0.18, p = .86). This finding gives further evidence that 
in terms of emotional regulation, there might not be a difference at all between the 
two labeling conditions. Further, since the manipulation of the labeling condition 
was different in the second study from the first study and the pilot, and was tested 
on both the negative (pilot and study 1) and ambiguous stimuli (study 2), the 
combined findings question Liberman et al.’s (2007, 2011) conclusion that affect 
labeling is a distinct mechanism of emotional regulation. It is believed that further 
studies on affect labeling might benefit from these findings in the attempt to 
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precisely depict and understand the qualities that make labeling in general, and 
affect labeling in particular, an emotional regulation mechanism.  
Hypothesis 2:  
This hypothesis was partially supported.  
When combining all four “realness” and engagement questions that were 
depicted above, the result is significant and in the direction that was predicted (t 
(238) = 1.98, p < .05). Further, the effect is maintained for the three “realness” 
questions (without the engagement one; t (238) = 2.42, p = 0.016). These results 
suggest that, as predicted, shared reality made the events in the image seem more 
real and engaging. However, a closer look at the results shows that there was only 
one question of the four that drove this effect: “the events depicted in the picture are 
relevant to my everyday life.” This question differentiates between the shared 
reality and the not shared reality condition; the events did seem more relevant for 
participants in the shared reality condition (t (238) = 2.25, p < .05). None of the 
other three questions was found to be significant by itself. Since questions 1 and 2 
targeted the “realness” of the events (question 1: ability to imagine the events; 
question 2: ability to picture oneself in the events) and engagement (question 4), 
while the question that was found to be significant (question 3) targeted the 
relevance of the events, it can be concluded that the current study showed that there 
is evidence that shared reality makes events (perceived reality) seem more relevant, 
but does not make them seem more real or engaging. This finding adds a distinction 
to the “realness” and relevance aspects of the operational mechanism of shared 
reality, as there was not a separation between the two in the research thus far 
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(Eitam & Higgins, 2010; Higgins et al., 2013). It had been postulated that the shared 
reality effect operates by making the events seem both more real and more relevant.  
The results of the current study show that this might not be the case, at least 
for emotionally ambiguous stimuli that were examined. As mentioned, this 
hypothesis was not examined in study 1, but it would be predicted that the result 
should be similar to study 2 and that the reason for the intensification of feeling that 
was found in study 1 in the shared reality condition was driven by the same 
mechanism: shared reality made the content more relevant and thus intensified the 
(already negative) emotional reaction to it. In study 2, since the stimuli were 
neutral, their increased relevance did not lead to intensified emotional reaction. 
Future studies should address this difference in an effort to understand the 
distinction between relevance and “realness” as operative mechanisms of shared 
reality.      
Hypothesis 3:  
This hypothesis was not supported. It was predicted that shared reality 
would promote epistemic certainty—participants will be more certain in their 
depiction of the events/stimuli. Participants were asked to first depict the events 
they saw in the image (in a free text format) and then to rate how certain they were 
in their depiction. Participants in the shared reality condition were only marginally 
significantly more certain in their depiction (t (238) = 1.87, p = .062) than 
participants in the not shared reality condition. This marginal trend is in the 
direction with previous shared reality research that suggests that shared reality 
promotes epistemic certainty, i.e., people are more certain about their perception of 
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reality if they share it. In fact, shared reality becomes the reality as was discussed 
above (see Kopietz et al., 2010 for a discussion of this issue). However, this was not 
supported in the current research. Since there is a trend in that direction, it is 
argued that a more powerful manipulation of shared reality (e.g., a more realistic 
situation of sharing) would have made this effect significant. The theoretical 
underpinnings of this proposed effect is rather consistent, and it seems that the 
failure to show this effect in the current study is a manifestation of the relative lack 
of power that was a result of the current computerized and controlled experimental 
manipulation of shared reality.  
Hypothesis 4: 
The hypothesis was very partially supported.  
While the positive and negative affect aggregates were not significantly 
different between the shared reality condition and the not shared reality condition, 
participants in the shared reality condition reported that they were less afraid (t 
(238) = -2.45, p < .05), and less guilty (t (238) = -1.96, p = .051). This finding is 
consistent with previous research that showed that guilt is more intensely elicited 
when emotional events are not shared with others (Finkenauer & Rime, 1998; Rime, 
2009), while fear was shown to be an emotion that is elicited more when people are 
alone (Scherer, Wallbott, Matsumoto, & Kudoh, 1988; Fischer et al., 2003). This 
would be in line with the relational aspect of shared reality: people share reality to 
feel more connected to others; which, in this case, might have led to feeling less 
guilty and less afraid. Further, it can be proposed that guilt and fear are attenuated 
since shared reality makes people feel less lonely (Pinel et al., 2006), a hypothesis 
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that should be studied further, by examining whether a diminished sense of 
loneliness acts as a mediator to feelings of guilt and fear.   
Hypothesis 5: 
Hypothesis 5 was not supported.  
There was not a significant difference in the security cluster (or any other) of 
the MAQ attachment questionnaire. It was predicted that shared reality would 
promote secure attachment, as one measure of connectedness to others. A well-
validated and sensitive measurement (MAQ) was used in this study under the 
assumption that the shared reality effect that was elicited would be powerful 
enough to affect participants’ general rating of attachment. Based on the research 
and theory of shared reality that was discussed, it is still believed that shared reality 
should promote higher sense of secure attachment. However, it seems that the 
manipulation in the current study was not powerful enough. Although attachment is 
considered to be a consistent trait that is affected by situational states (Ravitz et al., 
2010), the state of shared reality that was induced in this study was perhaps not 
powerful enough. Future studies should address this hypothesis with a more 
powerful manipulation of shared reality, such as a free-verbal sharing that would be 
more realistic and hence, potentially, more powerful, which might produce the effect 
that was expected in this study.   
Research question 2: 
The prediction of this research question was supported.  
As predicted, the order effect, which was found consistently in the first two 
experiments, disappeared in the second one (t (238) = 1.50, p = 0.134). Since the 
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images in this study were neutral there seemed to be no reason for habituation—the 
images did not illicit a strong emotional reaction and hence there was no intensity to 
be diminished. This finding situates the order effect as an independent emotional 
regulation mechanism that decreases the intensity of emotional reactions to 
negative stimuli, but disappears in neutral stimuli. Taken together, study 1 and 
study 2 identified two independent but connected mechanisms that affect emotional 
regulation: shared reality and order. While shared reality was found to intensify 
negative stimuli, and was found not to have any effect on ambiguous ones; the order 
of the stimuli was found to diminish participants’ negative ratings of intensity (but 
less so in the shared reality condition, which was found to maintain the intensity 
despite the order effect in study 1), and, similarly to shared reality, had no effect for 
ambiguous stimuli. Similarly to shared reality, future studies should focus on the 
order effect in positive stimuli as well in order to understand it better.   
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CHAPTER V: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The current research used an experimental paradigm from the social-
cognitive tradition to examine several clinically relevant questions regarding 
emotional experience and regulation. I was interested in the interpersonal aspects 
of emotional sharing and regulation and used a well-established experimental 
paradigm and concept from social psychology—shared reality—to study emotional 
processes of regulation and experience. Influenced by ideas from relational 
psychoanalysis and developmental psychology, this series of studies sought to 
examine empirically how sharing affects emotional processes, an area of 
investigation that still lacks empirical support (Rime, 2009). In addition, this series 
of studies sought to bridge the gap between social and clinical psychology, a 
relatively rare occurrence in contemporary psychology.  
The result is an initial, rudimentary story about the effects of shared reality 
on emotional processes and a new, and perhaps robust, experimental paradigm that 
was replicated in the current research and can be replicated further in future 
research. The fundamental and necessary conditions of shared reality were 
preserved in this research, and several new components were added to create a new 
experimental situation of shared reality that is relevant to the study of emotional 
processes. In what follows, I would like to briefly summarize and discuss the 
findings from both studies, discuss their limitations, and the possibilities for future 
research.  
The main finding of the current research is that shared reality intensifies and 
maintains emotional reaction to negative stimuli. In addition, the study suggests a 
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possible mechanism of operation through which shared reality might function in 
general, and produce the effect that was found in this study in particular. 
Specifically, current research suggested that shared reality affects emotional 
processes by making stimuli or aspects of the perceived reality seem more relevant 
(and thus more accessible; Eitam & Higgins, 2010).  
 The literature regarding the effects of sharing on emotional reactivity and 
regulation is limited and, perhaps even more importantly, lacks consistent empirical 
support: there is no consensus on the effects of sharing on emotional experience 
(even about the basic question of whether the effects are positive and regulatory, or 
negative/non-existent; Rime, 2009). On the one hand, some researchers emphasize 
the many psychological and health benefits of disclosure and sharing of emotions 
with others (e.g., Pennebaker & Seagal, 1999; Pennebaker et al., 2001). Clinical 
theorists point to the benefits of validation and sharing of one’s emotions in a safe, 
accepting, and attuned manner with a caregiver to healthy development (e.g., 
Linehan, 1993; Stern et al., 1985; Stern, 2000), and some believe that this validated, 
attuned manner of sharing creates the ability to regulate one’s emotions and is the 
central task of psychotherapy (e.g., Schore, 2009; Tronick, 2009).  
On the other hand, however, the empirical evidence is limited and not 
consistent. It seems that researchers agree on the long-term benefits of disclosure 
and sharing, but there is not enough data on immediate consequences of sharing. 
For example, we now know that debriefings after traumatic events have no efficacy 
in reducing symptoms (Arendt & Elklit, 2001; Rose & Bisson, 1998; Van Emmerik, 
Kamphuis, Hulsbosch, & Emmelkamp, 2002). The outcome of patients’ self-
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disclosure to their therapists has also been questioned and is considered to be 
inconsistent and dependent upon multiple variables (Farber, 2006).  The idea that 
expression of distress has an immediate and direct effect of relief (i.e., “the venting 
hypothesis”) has not been supported empirically either (Kennedy-Moore & Watson, 
1999). Perhaps even more strikingly, some studies claimed that sharing emotional 
reactions to a distressful event even with an empathic listener has no effect on 
emotional arousal (Nils & Rime, 2008). What seems to be consistent, however, is the 
finding that cognitive work or load, in both sharing and not sharing situations has a 
regulating effect. The evidence that cognitive load decreases emotional reactivity is 
consistent across studies—when people use their cognitive capacities more, the 
intensity of their emotional reactions diminishes (Kron et al., 2010; Rime, 2009).  
The current research is in line with the empirical data that suggests that 
sharing in itself does not regulate negative emotional responses; on the contrary, 
this research showed that shared reality intensifies emotional reactions to negative 
stimuli. In addition, since there was no apparent difference in terms of cognitive 
load (Kron et al., 2010) in the shared reality and the not-shared reality conditions, 
findings of current research are in line with the cognitive work/load hypotheses and 
do not reject them.  
Taken together, study 1 and 2 of the current research not only show the 
effect of shared reality on perceived emotional intensity, but also propose a possible 
mechanism through which shared reality operates. Study 2 showed that participants 
in the shared reality condition viewed the images as more relevant. It seems 
possible, then, that in a situation of shared reality stimuli that constitute subjects’ 
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perceived reality become more relevant (and thus accessible). The enhanced 
relevance that people achieve in a shared reality situation might explain the 
difference between the results in study 1 and 2: the negative stimuli in study 1 
seemed even more negative under the condition of shared reality, as perhaps its 
negativity became more relevant and accessible; however, the neutral and 
ambiguous stimuli of study 2 did not become less (or more) neutral or ambiguous, 
because what became more relevant was precisely the stimuli’s neutrality and 
ambiguity. Thus, in study 1 shared reality intensified the emotional reactions to the 
images, while in study 2 it had no such effect. Also, study 2 showed a minimal (p = 
.06) trend in a predicted direction that proposed that shared reality makes people 
more certain in their perception of reality. This proposition is well supported by 
literature (e.g., Hardin & Higgins, 1996) and it is believed that the fact that the 
current study showed only a minimally significant trend in that direction is a result 
of an underpowered (due to experimental constraints and especially to 
computerization) manipulation of shared reality. It is believed that future studies 
that will employ a more realistic manipulation of shared reality (and thus a more 
powerful one) will show this effect to be significant.  
Findings of the current research might also explain why sharing a troubling 
event with an empathic, validating listener (Nils & Rime, 2008) does not necessarily 
regulate one’s emotional reaction to a particular event. If the situation that is 
created with the listener is a shared reality situation, current research suggests that 
we should expect an immediate intensification rather than regulation of the 
emotional reaction. Perhaps, in the studies that showed an intensified emotional 
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reaction following sharing (see Nils & Rime, 2008), participants created a shared 
reality situation in which what was shared seemed more relevant to the sharers, 
became more accessible to them, and thus was intensified. Since in study 1 both the 
shared reality condition and the not shared reality condition were situations of 
sharing, it showed that shared reality has a unique intensifying effect, perhaps 
above and beyond regular sharing; although this proposition will have to be 
examined further in future studies. In the future, we can distinguish sharing 
situations between shared and not shared reality, and, based on current research, 
can expect different regulatory effect between the situations: it would be predicted 
that the shared reality situation would be more intensifying than the not-shared 
reality sharing situation.  
In short, findings of current research are consistent with the literature that 
suggests that sharing is not an immediate regulating strategy. Achieving shared 
reality with another person creates a perception of reality that highlights its 
relevant aspects and in a case of an emotional reaction to a negative event this could 
mean an immediate intensification of that reaction. The adaptive function of sharing 
is in creating a reliable and valid representation of the world (Hardin & Higgins, 
1996). This study suggests that this representation does not have immediate (i.e., in 
the moment) regulating effect; however, the regulating effects of (validated) sharing 
seem to be long-term and essential for psychological health (Fonagy & Target, 1997; 
Linehan, 1993; Stern, 2004). The lack of difference between the affective and 
categorical labeling conditions in this study might suggest that shared reality 
operates whenever anything relevant about the stimulus/reality is shared.  
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Current findings should serve as a cautionary sign to psychotherapists that 
encourage clients to share. It seems that the saying “it will get worse before it gets 
better” might be appropriate to the regulatory effect of sharing, as based on current 
findings (and some previous research), sharing intensifies immediate emotional 
reactions perhaps before it has a longer-term regulating effect (Stern, 2004; Stern et 
al., 1985). It should be noted that the paradigm of this study examined the effects of 
sharing to an anonymous audience (a common operationalization in shared reality 
research). It is plausible that the effect that was found would change as a result of 
the audience (i.e., with whom the reality is shared), type of sharing (current 
paradigm used set categories; other paradigms could use more free-form 
categories), and the audience reaction (beyond success/failure that was studied in 
the current research). All these possibilities are exciting paths for future research 
and each one of them represents a potential future manipulation of shared reality 
that should expand our knowledge of this concept. Nonetheless, and despite the 
limitations of this study, based on its initial findings researchers and clinicians 
would benefit from taking note of the immediate intensifying effects of sharing that 
were shown in the study, just as they should consider the multiple and differential 
outcomes of self-disclosure in psychotherapy in general (Farber, 2006).  
A somewhat more disappointing result of the current research was its 
relative lack of findings in terms of the effects of shared reality on emotional well-
being. It was predicted that shared reality would elevate participants’ measures of 
secure attachment. As was discussed, clinical theory and research emphasize the 
importance of validated sharing to healthy development in general, and a 
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development of secure attachments to others in particular (Fonagy & Target, 1997; 
Mikulincer & Shaver, 2010). Thus, it was predicted that even if shared reality 
intensifies negative emotional reactions it should still enhance a global (and general, 
i.e., not specific) sense of secure attachment. Since shared reality makes people feel 
less lonely and more connected to others (Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Pinel, 2006), it 
was predicted that a creation of shared reality—even though the sharing was 
operated through a computer with an anonymous audience—would result in an 
increase of an internal, global sense of secure attachment (i.e., not to specific people 
like parents or spouse, but as a general internal state; Ravitz, et al., 2010). As was 
also discussed, this research used a particular measure that was evaluated to be 
sensitive enough and general enough (not focusing on particular attachments) to 
detect such an effect if in fact it exists. However, such an effect was not shown, 
despite the sensitivity of the measure and the common relation to attachment as a 
“state-trait,” i.e., a trait that can be affected by temporary emotional states (Ravitz et 
al., 2010). It is believed that the reason for not finding any effect of shared reality on 
attachment was that the shared reality situation that was created was not powerful 
enough, or that the connection that was created with the imagined audience was not 
strong enough. I believe in the validity of the prediction of this study, as it is based 
so heavily on vast clinical theory and research, but it seems that in order to find an 
effect of shared reality on attachment, a more powerful manipulation of shared 
reality, perhaps a manipulation that will examine sharing to real/known people to 
the participant or sharing in a freer, more realistic manner, is needed. Alternatively, 
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a measure of attachment that is more sensitive to “state” rather than “trait” might 
also show this hypothesized effect.  
However, some important findings regarding the effects of shared reality on 
aspects of emotional well-being emerged in this research. The study showed that 
shared reality makes people feel less afraid and less guilty. As was discussed earlier, 
guilt was shown to be more intensely elicited when emotional events are not shared 
with others (Finkenauer & Rime, 1998; Rime, 2009), while fear was shown to be an 
emotion that is elicited more when people are alone (Scherer, Wallbott, Matsumoto, 
& Kudoh, 1988; Fischer et al., 2003). Thus, it was proposed that these two negative 
feelings were diminished because shared reality makes people feel less lonely 
(Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Pinel et al., 2006). The connection between shared reality 
and fear and guilt, and the possible mediation of diminished sense of loneliness, are 
all exciting possibilities for future research. Based on this research and previous 
findings, it would be reasonable to predict that shared reality makes people feel less 
afraid and guilty because it makes them feel less lonely, which is a question that 
should be directly addressed in the future.  
The combined findings of study 1 and 2 suggest that clinicians should be 
aware of the potential effects of a shared reality situation with their patients. If 
indeed such a situation was created (Echterhoff et al., 2009) the clinician might 
expect that if the themes that are discussed with the patient have a negative 
emotional valence, the patient might experience an intensification of her perceived 
emotions, and that this intensification will be sustained for a longer time by shared 
reality (i.e., the habituation of the feelings—the order effect in this study—would 
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decrease). While not necessarily a negative outcome, the awareness of the 
intensification of emotions seems important, as so frequently clinicians are 
encouraging patients to share their emotions and experiences. Current research 
would propose that clinicians might benefit from assessing whether they are 
creating shared reality with their patients (by following the four requisites for 
creating shared reality that were discussed; Echterhoff et al., 2009), and if indeed so, 
they should be aware of the potential consequences. As so much of current clinical 
literature is focusing on the regulatory aspects of psychotherapy (e.g., Linehan 
1993; Schore, 2009), current research proposes that the immediate effects of 
sharing, in a shared reality situation, might complicate that task and might increase 
the emotional intensity of the negative emotional experience in therapy, perhaps 
before it is regulated over time. By no means a negative consequence, this study 
suggests that the potential elevated intensity should be expected and worked with 
in psychotherapy: when patient and therapist achieve shared reality they might 
expect to experience more intense emotions, which, even if negative, might be very 
beneficial, especially for affect-focused treatments that seek to elicit such emotions 
(e.g., Schore, 2009). 
The current research also shows that shared reality makes people feel less 
afraid and guilty. This seems important to the clinical situation as well, and perhaps 
suggests a potential nuance to the perception of the therapy situation as a “safe 
space;” it would be suggested by current research that the therapy situation might 
be perceived by the patient as safe, as long as there is shared reality between her 
and her therapist. The reduced sense of loneliness in a shared reality situation 
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(Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Higgins, 1992) and the perceived commonality seem to be 
especially appropriate therapeutic goals that, it would be postulated by current 
research, have the potential to make the psychotherapy feel safe for the patient who 
will feel less afraid and guilty with a therapist with whom she shares reality.  
Limitations and directions for future research:  
 The main limitation of the current study was the use of a computerized 
response instead of an actual person. As mentioned, shared reality research so far 
has been done in computerized paradigms, without an actual person with whom 
participants share reality (Echterhoff et al., 2009). The main reason for the use of 
this computerized paradigm is that shared reality effect disappears when 
participants share with people they perceive to be from an out-group (Echterhoff et 
al., 2005, 2008). Since it is almost impossible to completely control the group effect 
in real and not computerized interactions for every participant—for example, would 
a participant in the current research perceive another participant from an opposite 
gender as in or out group?—shared reality research in general and in this research 
in particular, has employed a computerized paradigm. Also, it is notable that this 
paradigm had achieved significant effects in the past and achieved some significant 
and important effects in the current research, as well.  
 There are two main limitations for using a computerized paradigm instead of 
a real person. First, participants would be always suspicious (and especially 
participants that have a background in experimental psychology) of such a 
manipulation and would suspect that there is not any other participant, if they do 
not see him/her. This tendency to suspect might have been even higher in the 
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current research, as participants were led to believe that their emotional reaction 
matches someone else’s, which to a certain degree might be more difficult to believe 
than the previous, more modest perhaps, manipulations of shared reality (e.g., the 
“other participant” liking/not-liking a target of communication). The percentages of 
“believers” in the current research were described earlier. Also, and based on the 
manipulation check of the first study, an additional “boost” was added in the form of 
Google-chat, which seemed to make the manipulation more believable. Nonetheless, 
to eliminate the suspicion completely a real person should be used as the target of 
sharing. It seems that in the paradigm of the current research, which is based on 
emotional sharing, perhaps it is worth doing so despite the risk of in/out group 
“noise” effects, as it is very important to make the situation seem realistic—to 
imitate emotional sharing in real life.  
An additional limitation of using a computerized paradigm is that it 
potentially diminishes the power of the manipulation of shared reality. It seems 
reasonable (although there is not empirical evidence for that proposition in the 
shared reality research) that sharing with a real person and not a computer would 
be experienced as more powerful for participants. This possibility might be 
especially important in the exploration of the effects of shared reality on attachment 
and well-being. As mentioned, the theoretical foundation for the prediction of these 
effects, as well as the prediction of increased certainty in a situation of shared 
reality, seems rather robust; thus, the lack of them in current findings might be 
explained by an underpowered manipulation. This would provide an additional 
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reason for the use of a real person rather than a computer as a target of sharing in 
future studies of shared reality and emotional processes.  
Another possible improvement of the manipulation of shared reality that was 
employed in the current research might be allowance of a more free-form sharing 
(e.g., a free-verbal depiction of the images and not a forced choice). Constricted by 
the considerations of experimental control and operationalization, a paradigm that 
forced the participants to choose a category from a particular set was introduced in 
study 1 to make sharing as uniform as possible for all participants. Although this 
paradigm was expanded in study 2 to create a more continuous (rather than 
categorical) experience of sharing, it still operated as a forced choice rather than a 
free format. In the future, and risking less control of the manipulation, research 
should examine shared reality in a freer, more realistic format. This seems 
especially important when studying the effects of shared reality on emotional 
processes.   
 The current research examined the effects of shared reality only on negative 
and ambivalent emotional stimuli, as I was mostly interested (for clinical purposes) 
in these emotional categories. However, an exploration of the effects of shared 
reality on positive stimuli should enrich our understating of the effects of shared 
reality on emotional processes. The specific predictions—based on previous and 
current research—regarding the possible effects of shared reality when reactions to 
positive emotional stimuli would be shared were discussed earlier, and they could 
be an additional focus for future research.   
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 As an essentially exploratory research paradigm, the current research did not 
focus on particular clinical populations. Perhaps it is still too soon in the evolution of 
the research of shared reality: there is much in the mechanism of shared reality that 
still needs to be investigated, especially in its relation to emotional processes. 
However, as a more distant goal, shared reality should also be examined with 
particular clinical populations. Since shared reality is hypothesized to reduce 
loneliness and promote connection (Higgins, 1992; Hardin & Higgins, 1996), it 
seems an especially fitting concept and paradigm to examine with populations such 
as those that suffer from depression or severe attachment disorders.  
 In summary, the paradigm that was introduced in the current research 
represents an initial attempt to connect the shared reality concept with emotional, 
clinically relevant, themes. It is believed that clinicians would benefit from 
considering whether the different situations of sharing with their patients are 
situations of shared reality. As was discussed, the current research suggests several 
possible effects that such a situation might produce and to which clinicians should 
be aware. Further, it is believed that similarly to the use of virtual reality in studies 
of trauma (Olasov-Rothbaum et al., 2004) the paradigm that was introduced in the 
current research could be easily applied to study emotional reactions of patients in 
psychotherapy. Current research proposed an experimental situation that could be 
easily replicated, creating a potential ’portable lab’ to study the effects of sharing in 
psychotherapy (or elsewhere) on patients’ emotional experience and regulation. 
Whether with a use of a computer, or in a more free form of sharing, patients and 
therapists can follow the four conditions of shared reality, create it, and examine the 
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emotional effects of such situations. Further, the paradigm of shared reality that was 
advanced in this research suggests a potential theory of emotional reactions of 
patients and thus can provide a framework of understanding patients’ emotional 
reactions. A mutual exploration, with patients, of such reactions in a ’portable lab’ of 
shared reality might be beneficial for both the patient and the therapist. It seems 
that such an exploration would be in line with the contemporary practices and 
emphasis of the interpersonal/relational psychodynamic school that emphasizes 
mutuality and sharing of meaning between therapist and patient. It is believed that 
shared reality is a specific, experimentally derived, situation of an interpersonal 
creation of meaning through sharing and also an experimental paradigm that can 
test its effects.  
This paradigm seems to be an appropriate template that could be modified 
and restructured in various manners in the future, as it was throughout this 
research, to better understand the effects of shared reality on emotional processes. 
Perhaps it would be especially important to direct future research to focus on the 
emotionally relevant information people share (building upon the examined 
comparison between affective and categorical conditions in this research), how it is 
done (expanding upon the “relevance and certainty” mechanism that was proposed 
in this research), and what other emotional variables are affected by shared reality 
(adding other variables to the ones studied in this research). I hope that the current 
research will stimulate further study of shared reality in relation to emotional 
experience and regulation and will help us understand better how sharing our 
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Appendix A (An Example of an IAPS Image; Langet. al., 2005) 
 
1. Affect labeling categories: Sad, Disgusted, Scared, Angry. 
2. Category labeling categories: Tool, Action, Behavior, Person. 
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Appendix D (MAQ; Carver, 1997) 
 
Respond to each of the following statements by expressing how much you agree with it (if you do 
generally agree) or how much you disagree with it (if you generally disagree).  Make all your 
responses on the answer sheet only.  Do not leave any items blank.  Please be as accurate as you can 
be throughout, and try especially hard not to let your answer to any one item influence your answer to 
any other item.  Treat each one as though it is completely unrelated to the others.  There are no right or 
wrong answers, you are simply to express your own personal feelings and opinions.  Choose from 
these reponse options: 
 
 1 = I DISagree with the statement a lot  
 2 = I DISagree with the statement a little  
 3 = I agree with the statement a little  
 4 = I agree with the statement a lot 
 
1.  When I'm close to someone, it gives me a sense of comfort about life in general.  
2.  I often worry that my partner doesn't really love me.  
3.  I have trouble getting others to be as close as I want them to be.  
4.  I find it easy to be close to others.  
5.  I often worry my partner will not want to stay with me.  
6.  Others want me to be more intimate than I feel comfortable being.  
7.  It feels relaxing and good to be close to someone.  
8.  I am very comfortable being close to others.  
9.  I don’t worry about others abandoning me.  
10.  My desire to merge sometimes scares people away.  
11.  I prefer not to be too close to others.  
12.  I find others are reluctant to get as close as I would like.  
13.  I get uncomfortable when someone wants to be very close.  




Apendix E (An Example of a Neutral and Ambiguous IAPS Image; Lang et al., 2005) 
 
 
 
